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Contracting for Healthcare: Price Terms
in Hospital Admission Agreements
George A. Nation III*
“I should not agree with your young friends,” said Marcus
curtly, “I am so old-fashioned as to believe in free contract.”
“I, being older, perhaps believe in it even more,” answered M.
Louis smiling. “But surely it is a very old principle of law that a
leonine contract is not a free contract.  And it is hypocrisy to pretend
that a bargain between a starving man and a man with all the food is
anything but a leonine contract.” He glanced up at the fire-escape, a
ladder leading up to the balcony of a very high attic above. “I live in
that garret; or rather on that balcony.  If I fell off the balcony and
hung on a spike, so far from the steps that somebody with a ladder
could offer to rescue me if I gave him a hundred million francs, I
should be quite morally justified in using his ladder and then telling
him to go to hell for his hundred million.  Hell, indeed, is not out of
the picture; for it is a sin of injustice to force an advantage against the
desperate.  Well, all those poor men are desperate; they all hang
starving on spikes.  If they must not bargain collectively, they cannot
bargain at all.  You are not supporting contract; you are opposing all
contract; for yours cannot be a real contract at all.”**
ABSTRACT
This article discusses the application of contract law princi-
ples to the relationship between hospitals and patients to deter-
mine how much patients owe for the health care they receive. For
patients who are covered by in-network health insurance the ex-
act nature of the contract created with the hospital usually is not
relevant to the patient’s financial obligation because the patient’s
contract with the hospital is superseded by the contract between
the patient’s health insurer and the hospital. Nevertheless, even
in-network patients are financially impacted, via increased insur-
ance premiums, by the contract analysis discussed here, and for
* Professor of Law & Business Lehigh University.
** G.K. CHESTERTON, The Unmentionable Man, in THE PARADOXES OF MR.
POND 84, 96 (Indo-European Publishing 2011) (1936).
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the increasing number of patients who are self-pay the contract
entered into with the hospital will determine the amount that the
patient is obligated to pay. Self-pay patients include patients who
have insurance but are receiving care out-of-network or have so-
called high-deductible plans, which do not apply until the deduct-
ible has been met, and uninsured patients. As networks become
narrower the number of self-pay patients increases dramatically.
Moreover, the ability of hospitals to threaten to bill out-of-net-
work patients for exorbitant list prices forces insurers to agree to
excessive payments for in-network hospitals, thereby driving up
premiums for in-network patients.
Contract law determines the financial relationship between
self-pay patients and providers. For example, depending on the
facts and circumstances surrounding a patient’s admission to the
hospital, the patient’s financial obligation may be determined by
an express contract, if an admission type agreement is signed and
found to be enforceable, an implied-in-fact contract, based on the
conduct of the parties, or a quasi-contract, sometimes called an
implied-in-law contract, if the patient was unable to contract be-
cause, for example, the patient was unconscious when admitted.
Self-pay patients, who enter the hospital through the emer-
gency department, simply lack capacity to contract due to the
rushed, stressful and tension-laden emergency circumstances. As
a result, most contracts signed by or on behalf of patients in the
emergency department are not enforceable and the obligation of
these patients to pay for the medical care they have received is
based quasi contract. With respect to patients who enter the hos-
pital other than through the emergency department, the admis-
sion agreement they sign is an adhesion contract presented on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis that does not contain an actual price but
only an ambiguous price formula tied to the hospital’s list prices.
As a result, even in a non-emergency context where the patient
may be capable of giving assent, true assent by the patient is lack-
ing, and the courts must closely scrutinize such contracts for vio-
lations of public policy such as unfair price terms. A hospital’s
exercise its prodigious bargaining power to extract a promise
from a self-pay patient to pay exorbitant billed charges or list
prices is an example of an unfair term that courts should refuse to
enforce.
Thus, notwithstanding the type of contract created in a par-
ticular case, this article concludes that the proper application of
contract law principles dictates that patients are usually required
to pay no more than the reasonable market-based value of the
health care they receive. The determination of reasonable value
is based on the market value—the average actual reimbursement
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the hospital receives for the care in question—and not on the
hospitals unilaterally-set list price or billed charge.
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INTRODUCTION
The amount that hospitals claim to be owed for medical ser-
vices varies dramatically based on the entity paying the bill.1
Speaking generally, there are three levels of payment.  The first,
and highest, is the chargemaster price, which is the hospital’s list
1. See George A. Nation III, Determining the Fair and Reasonable Value of
Medical Services: The Affordable Care Act, Government Insurers, Private Insurers
and Uninsured Patients, 65 BAYLOR L. REV. 425, 446–49 (2013) [hereinafter Na-
tion, Fair and Reasonable] (discussing price discrimination by hospitals based on
the entity paying the hospital).
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price.2  These list prices are contained in a computer file called a
Charge Description Master (CDM).3  Chargemaster price rates are
excessive; on average they are about 500 percent higher than the
amount that Medicare pays for the same care!4  This disparity is due
to the fact that CDM prices are set unilaterally by hospitals without
any market constraint.5  CDM rates are used by hospitals primarily
as a cudgel to threaten commercial health insurance companies
with exorbitant prices unless they agree to the reimbursement rates
demanded by the hospital.6  In other words, if the insurance com-
2. See George A. Nation III, Hospital Chargemaster Insanity: Heeling the
Healers, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 745, 746–47 (2016) [hereinafter Nation, Chargemaster]
(explaining that today chargemaster prices are insanely high, often running 10
times the amount that hospitals routinely accept as full payment from insurers); id.
at 748; George A. Nation III, Obscene Contracts: The Doctrine of Unconscionabil-
ity and Hospital Billing of the Uninsured, 94 KY. L.J. 101, 105 (2005) [hereinafter
Nation, Obscene Contracts] (arguing that the admission agreement between a hos-
pital and a patient, in which the patient agrees to pay the hospital’s “full charges”
for necessary medical services, is unenforceable because it is unconscionable).
3. Nation, Chargemaster, supra note 2, at 746–47.  A chargemaster is a list of
all goods and services provided by the hospital and the hospital’s list price, or
charge, for each item.
4. See, e.g., Steven I. Weissman, Remedies for an Epidemic of Medical Pro-
vider Price Gouging, 90 FLA. B.J. 22, 24 (2016) (noting that “[a]verage charge
master pricing at Florida hospitals is a minimum of 500 percent of Medicare allow-
able amounts”); see id. at 24 n.21 (citing Medicare Provider Utilization and Pay-
ment Data, CNTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://go.cms.gov/
2NloKVr [https://perma.cc/8WQC-44KH] (last visited June 30, 2019)) (discussing
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services data revealing hospital list prices (i.e.,
charges) and Medicare actual payments for the 100 most common inpatient ser-
vices by state averages and specific hospitals).
5. See Nation, Chargemaster, supra note 2, at 76.  Importantly,
[t]he single most important reason that chargemaster rates remain so high
is that competitive forces in the healthcare market have broken down,
and as a result, many hospitals may raise their chargemaster rates with
impunity.  Moreover, such rate increases are associated with increases,
albeit much smaller ones, in revenues.  Finally, hospitals currently have
absolutely no reason to reduce their chargemaster rates.  That is, hospi-
tals suffer no competitive disadvantage by setting their rates ever higher
because no market participants with any market power pay CDM rates.
Id.
6. See George A. Nation III, Healthcare and the Balance-Billing Problem: The
Solution Is the Common Law of Contracts and Strengthening the Free Market for
Healthcare, 61 VILL. L. REV. 153, 154–55, 163 (2016) [hereinafter Nation, Balance
Billing] (noting that the hospital’s bargaining power is increased by the fact that if
the insurance company fails to agree to the reimbursement rates desired by the
hospital, then all of the insurance company’s customers will be balance billed at
exorbitant chargemaster rates); Nation, Chargemaster, supra note 2, at 748 (“The
purpose of these fictitious list prices is to serve as a starting or anchoring point for
negotiations with third-party payers regarding the amount that they will actually
pay the hospital for goods and services.”).  In addition, excessive CDM rates are
beneficial to hospitals in other illegitimate ways.  For example, they allow hospitals
to overstate their charitable care. See Nation, Chargemaster, supra note 2, at
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pany does not agree to pay the reimbursement prices that are ac-
ceptable to the hospital, then patients with that company’s
insurance will be out-of-network with respect to that hospital, and
the hospital will demand its excessive CDM prices from those pa-
tients by “balance billing” them.7  Obviously, this practice will upset
those patients and may cause them to buy insurance from a differ-
ent insurance company that is in-network with that hospital.8  From
the hospital’s perspective, however, there is every reason to set
chargemaster prices ever higher as there is no penalty for doing so.9
757–58.  Exorbitant CDM rates also allow hospitals to increase their revenue from
sources other than in-network insurance companies by enabling hospitals to price
gouge self-pay patients, especially in third-party liability cases where the ability to
use hospital lien statutes greatly increases the hospital’s ability to recover these
insanely high prices.  See George A. Nation III, Hospitals Use the Pernicious
Chargemaster Pricing System to Take Advantage of Accident Victims: Stopping
Abusive Hospital Billing, 66 DRAKE L. REV. 645, 699 (2018) [hereinafter Nation,
Accident] (“Hospitals unilaterally set their charges at grossly excessive levels that
the market rejects, and thus the vast majority of patients do not pay, which is why
these exorbitant chargemaster-based rates are not a proper measure of the price
anyone should pay for healthcare.”).  However, “because of the complexities in-
volved in healthcare billing and payment systems and the confusion they cause,
hospitals are permitted to enforce these excessive and market-rejected rates
against self-pay patients.” Id. at 699.  Finally, “even worse, in the [third-party lia-
bility] situation, hospitals may use (misuse) the force of a government-granted lien
to enforce these unilaterally set excessive charges.” Id. at 699–70.
7. See Nation, Balance Billing, supra note 6, at 154–55 (describing balance
billing and noting that because an out-of-network patient’s insurer has no contract
with the hospital, the hospital is not obligated to accept the payment from the
insurance company as full payment and, therefore, the hospital bills the patient for
the balance—the difference between the exceedingly high hospital list price and
the reasonable amount paid by the insurer).  In addition, this means that exorbi-
tant chargemaster based prices are really set to be discounted and not paid.  How-
ever, if a hospital sees a chance to collect these enormous prices, it usually pursues
the opportunity aggressively and relentlessly, causing a tremendous amount of fi-
nancial hardship and pain in the process.  The media has covered many cases of
abusive conduct by hospitals trying to collect their excessive “full charges.” See
also, e.g., Nation, Obscene Contracts, supra note 2, at 101–05 (recounting examples
of harsh conduct by hospitals against patients to collect bills); Nation,
Chargemaster, supra note 2, at 761–63 (same); George A. Nation III, Non-Profit
Charitable Tax-Exempt Hospitals—Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing: To Increase Fair-
ness and Enhance Competition in Health Care All Hospitals Should be For-Profit
and Taxable, 42 RUTGERS L.J. 141, 177–78 (2010) [hereinafter Nation, Wolves]
(discussing harsh collection tactics used by many charitable hospitals).
8. See Gerard F. Anderson, From ‘Soak the Rich’ to ‘Soak the Poor’: Recent
Trends in Hospital Pricing, 26 HEALTH AFF. 780, 785 (2007) [hereinafter Ander-
son, Soak the Rich] (noting that hospitals set high charges as a negotiating strategy
with managed care plans and explaining that “[i]f a plan does not have a contract
with the hospital then it is expected to pay full charge”; “[t]he higher the charges,
the greater the incentive to sign a contract with hospital”).
9. See Nation, Balance Billing, supra note 6, at 160 (noting that “[a]s hospitals
consolidate, more large healthcare systems are created, and these dominant sys-
tems do not feel any competitive pressure to contract with insurance companies at
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The second highest payment level is the price paid by in-net-
work commercial health insurance companies pursuant to contracts
formed between insurance companies, hospitals, and other provid-
ers.10  On average, these health insurance companies pay a little less
than one third of the CDM list price, and hospitals willingly agree
to accept this amount as full payment.11  In other words, the
chargemaster-based price is more than three times higher than the
price hospitals agree to accept as full payment from commercial in-
surance companies.12  The prices paid by in-network commercial in-
surers are, on average, about 160 percent of the Medicare
reimbursement rate.13  Another very important aspect of the con-
tracts executed between commercial health insurers and hospitals,
pursuant to which hospitals become “in network,” is that these con-
tracts require the hospital to accept the agreed-upon reimburse-
ment amount as full payment.  Accordingly, the hospital is
prohibited from billing the patient for any amount in excess of the
reasonable reimbursement rates”); Nation, Chargemaster, supra note 2, at 760
(stating that “hospitals currently have absolutely no reason to reduce their
chargemaster rates—that is, hospitals suffer no competitive disadvantage by set-
ting their rates ever higher”).
10. Importantly these are the only prices that can be said to be market de-
rived.  See Nation, Fair and Reasonable, supra note 1, at 460–61 (noting that these
rates reflect most strongly and effectively operating free-market).
11. Today, on average, hospital chargemaster prices exceed payments by
more than a factor of three.  Michael Batty & Benedic Ippolito, Mystery of the
Chargemaster: Examining the Role of Hospital List Prices in What Patients Actually
Pay, 36 HEALTH AFFAIRS 689, 689 (2017).  For example, if Medicare reimbursed
for a particular procedure at $100.00, then the average commercial insurance pay-
ment, agreed to by the hospital, would be $160.00.  But the CDM based rate would
be three times the commercial insurance rate, totaling $480.00.  Moreover, since
hospitals willingly agree to accept this amount from commercial insurance, it is
reasonable to conclude that it represents not only coverage of their costs but also a
reasonable profit as well. See Michael K. Beard & Dylan H. Marsh, Arbitrary
Healthcare Pricing and the Misuse of Hospital Lien Statutes by Healthcare Provid-
ers, 38 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 255, 255–57 (2014).
12. See Nation, Accident, supra note 6, at 651–52 (noting that “[o]n average,
hospitals receive only 33 percent of their chargemaster prices from all payers”).
However, in many instances, chargemaster rates can be even higher.  For example,
California Pacific Medical Center, owned by Sutter Health, has a chargemaster
rate of $96,642.00 to treat a stroke while the Medicare reimbursement for this
treatment is $9,583.00.  See Nation, Chargemaster, supra note 2, at 762 (discussing
this and other examples of egregious chargemaster rates).  In other words, Medi-
care reimbursed less than 10 percent of the billed chargemaster rate. See id.
13. Nationwide, commercial insurance companies pay hospitals an average of
approximately 160 percent (1.6 times) allowable Medicare reimbursement rates,
which is equivalent to approximately 150 percent of hospital costs. See MEDICARE
PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT
POLICY 67 (2015).
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agreed-upon reimbursement with the exception of co-payments, de-
ductibles, and coinsurance amounts.14
Finally, the lowest payment amounts are those set by govern-
ment insurers, Medicare and Medicaid.15  As noted, Chargemaster-
based rates are, on average, about 500 percent above Medicare re-
imbursement levels.16  Medicare rates are set by the Center for
Medicare Services (CMS) to provide hospitals with a reasonable re-
imbursement.17  Although some have argued that Medicare reim-
bursements represent only about 90 percent of hospital costs,18
others have argued that efficiently run hospitals do make a profit
on Medicare reimbursements.19  Hospitals agree to accept the
Medicare reimbursement amounts when they sign a Provider
Agreement with CMS.20  Hospitals are not required to sign a Pro-
vider Agreement with CMS.  However, if the hospital does not sign
14. See Nation, Balance Billing, supra note 6, at 154–155 (discussing balance
billing and comparing it to the billing practices used when a contract exists be-
tween the patient’s insurer and the hospital).
15. See Nation, Fair & Reasonable, supra note 1, at 459–460.  In fact, some
have argued that the government insurers reimburse below cost.  However not all
Medicare reimbursement rates are unprofitable for hospitals. Id.; Matthew Ygle-
sias, Do Health Care Providers Lose Money on Medicare Patients?, SLATE:
MONEYBOX (Feb. 22 2013, 3:10 PM), http://bit.ly/2YnyfVh [https://perma.cc/VSH9-
ZS8D] (suggesting such claims are dubious and noting that even though Medicare
reimbursement rates may be below fully allocated costs for some hospitals, the
rates are in excess of marginal costs and, therefore, add significant profits once
fixed costs are covered).
16. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
17. See Nation, Chargemaster, supra note 2, at 767 (discussing Medicare and
Medicaid reimbursement procedures); see also Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. v.
Thompson, 380 F.3d 142, 144–45 (3d Cir. 2004) (summarizing developments in set-
ting reimbursements in the Medicare program).
18. Virgil Dickson, Slumping Medicare Margins Put Hospitals on Precarious
Cliff, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Nov. 28, 2017, 12:00 AM), http://bit.ly/2XfRkHo
[https://perma.cc/B7NE-2LHU] (“In 2015, the aggregate margin hit a negative
7.1% across hospitals, according to the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission;
margins are expected sink to a negative 10% this year.”); cf. Yglesias, supra
note15.
19. See generally William O. Cleverley, Making Money with Medicare Pay-
ments, HFMA, https://bit.ly/2kR3Tfa [https://perma.cc/V7X9-38WZ] (last visited
Sept. 2, 2018).
20. CMS develops Conditions of Participation (COPs) and Conditions for
Coverage (CFCs) that health care organizations must meet in order to begin and
continue participating in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. See Conditions for
Coverage (CfCs) & Conditions for Participations (CoPs), CNTRS. FOR MEDICARE
& MEDICAID SERVS., https://go.cms.gov/2mhAuev [https://perma.cc/DY6N-L646]
(last visited June 20, 2019).  Also, a hospital may terminate its participation at any
time. See CNTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE GENERAL IN-
FORMATION, ELIGIBILITY AND ENTITLEMENT MANUAL, Ch. 5 § 10.6.1 (rev. 120,
Nov. 2018), https://go.cms.gov/2RKqOoj [https://perma.cc/7RN2-EF6H] (“A pro-
vider may terminate its agreement . . . by filing with the Secretary a written notice
of its intention to terminate the agreement”).
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a Provider Agreement, the hospital cannot receive Medicare pay-
ments.21 Medicaid reimbursements are usually lower than Medicare
reimbursements.22
On average, chargemaster-based rates are 350 percent higher
than the average reimbursement that hospitals receive from all pay-
ers.23  It is important to recognize that there are no restrictions
under federal law and very few state regulations controlling the
level at which hospitals can set their CDM prices.24  Because no
private health insurance company or government insurer pays
21. See Mary Lou Weden, Why Do Hospitals Get Accredited by The Joint
Commission?, R1 RCM BLOG (Sept. 15, 2016), http://bit.ly/2xm7G6N [https://per
ma.cc/E8BN-7MC6] (“Quite simply, hospitals pursue accreditation because it is
required in order for their organizations to receive payment from federally funded
Medicare and Medicaid programs.”).
22. See Nation, Fair & Reasonable, supra note 1, at 459 n.268 (citation omit-
ted) (noting that “on average in the U.S. Medicaid’s payments to hospitals fall well
short of fully allocated costs”).
23. See Batty & Ippolito, supra note 11, at 689.
24. See Nation, Chargemaster, supra note 2, at 746–747 (noting that “[e]ach
hospital maintains its own unique chargemaster, which it updates annually or more
frequently as it sees fit, and extreme variation in list prices among hospitals, even
those in the same geographic area, is common”); cf. Banner Health v. Medical Sav.
Ins. Co., 163 P.3d 1096 (2007).  Banner Health sued patients for breach of contract
for failing to pay for the services they received and based its claim on the Condi-
tions of Admission (“COA”) signed by the patients upon entering a Banner hospi-
tal. Id. at 1098–99.  The COA provided that “I will pay the hospitals [sic] usual and
customary charges, which are those rates filed annually with the Arizona Depart-
ment of Health Services” or will “pay the account of the patient.” Id. at 1098.  It is
important to note that the majority found that Arizona had a regulatory regime
requiring hospitals to file their CDM rates with state regulators who had to ap-
prove them before they became effective. Id. at 1100.  This was a point of conten-
tion for the dissent, who said that it was an informational requirement only and
that there was no substantive review of the rates by the state. Id. at 1105.  How-
ever, the majority’s opinion must be seen in light of its assumption that the CDM
rates were required to be filed with and approved by the state and further that the
CDM rates had to be published, posted, and available to the public in the lobby of
each hospital. Id. at 1100.  As a result, there was a significant issue regarding
whether the COAs—which did not specifically mention that the rates referred to
were the same rates filed with the Arizona Department of Health Services—suffi-
ciently referred to those rates. See id. at 1102–04.  The majority ultimately held
that both types of COAs were sufficient in light of Arizona’s unique regulatory
regime and distinguished the instant case from the case Doe v. HCA Health Servs.
Of Tenn., Inc., 46 S.W.3d. 191 (Tenn. 2001), a case in which there was “no statutory
scheme governing the setting, filing, and publishing of hospital rates and charges.”
Id. at 1101.  The Banner Health court went on to note that in Doe, “the hospital’s
‘Charge Master’ rates were in fact confidential and not ascertainable by a patient”
and that “the contract with the patient contained no reference to the ‘Charge
Master’ rates.” Banner Health, 163 P.3d at 1101 (citing Doe, 46 S.W.3d at 193–94).
Finally, the court emphasized that “[t]he Doe court concluded that the contract
was ‘indefinite’ and unenforceable because it did ‘not refer to a document or ex-
trinsic facts by which the price will be determined.’” Id. (citing Doe, 46 S.W.3d at
197).  The Majority felt it inappropriate to consider whether the rates set by the
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CDM rates, there is no market constraint on the level of these
rates.25  CDM rates are exorbitant.26
Contract law determines the financial relationship between
hospital and patient.27  Depending on the facts and circumstances
surrounding a patient’s admission, the rights and obligations be-
tween the patient and the hospital are determined either by an ex-
press contract, an implied-in-fact contract, or a quasi contract.  If a
patient signs an admission agreement and it is deemed enforceable,
then an express contract is created.  When a patient does not sign
an admission agreement, or if a signed admission agreement is
found to be unenforceable, the parties may have created an im-
hospital were excessive because the state had, in the Majority’s view, approved
those rates. Id. at 1103.
25. No market participants with any market power pay CDM based prices.
See Nation, Chargemaster, supra note, 2 at 764 (“[N]o one—not hospital adminis-
trators, not government insurers, and not private insurers—expect the
chargemaster rates to be paid”).  As a result, hospitals suffer no competitive disad-
vantage by increasing their CDM rates.  Moreover, in the case of self-pay patients,
the only market participants expected to pay chargemaster rates, hospitals until
recently treated their CDM prices as proprietary and kept them secret.  A new rule
took effect on January 1, 2019, requiring hospitals that accept Medicare patients to
make their CDM available to the public. See Hospital Inpatient Prospective Pay-
ment System for Acute Care Hospitals and the Long-Term Care Hospital Prospec-
tive Payment System and Policy Changes and Fiscal Year 2019 Rates, 83 Fed. Reg.
41,686 (Aug. 17, 2018) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. Parts 4212–13, 424, 495).  Un-
fortunately, published CDMs will not allow self-pay patients to determine the
price they will actually have to pay for the healthcare they are going to receive
and, as a result, the new rule will not create meaningful price transparency. See
Julie Appleby & Barbara Feder Ostrov, Hospitals Must Post Prices Online, But
They May Be More Confusing Than Helpful, CNN.COM (Jan. 7, 2019, 3:18 AM),
https://cnn.it/2FRd1aO [https://perma.cc/KPL2-F3MZ].  A CDM contains between
20 and 30,000 separate line items.  Even with access to the CDM, it is virtually
impossible for the consumer to use it to calculate the amount that the patient will
owe for a specific procedure.  For example, a patient is in no position to determine
the specific goods and services the hospital will use in performing a knee replace-
ment.  Nor do patients typically understand medical coding, which is the key to
deciphering the CDM.  Interestingly, however, government insurance as well as
most commercial insurance companies reimburse hospitals based on procedures
and not based on à la cart pricing.  As I have argued elsewhere, if procedure- based
pricing (the total amount the hospital is reimbursed on average for a knee replace-
ment, an MRI, or a CAT scan, etc.) was made readily available to consumers, this
would be useful transparency.  Such transparency would, in turn, lead to price
competition among hospitals. See Nation, Chargemaster, supra note 2, at 773–780
(proposing procedure-based reimbursement transparency).
26. See generally Nation, Chargemaster, supra note 2 (giving examples of ex-
orbitant chargemaster rates and discussing how and why chargemasters came to
reflect grossly excessive rates divorced from real prices).
27. Nation, Accident, supra note 6, at 687 (noting that “fundamentally, a hos-
pital’s claim to payment from a patient is based on contract law”); see also Nation,
Balance Billing, supra note 6, at 175–181 (discussing contract principles and con-
tracting in the context of healthcare).
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plied-in-fact contract based on their conduct.  Finally, if no express
contract or implied-in-fact contract has been created, then a quasi
contract, sometimes called an implied-in-law contract, will define
the rights and obligations of the patient and the hospital.  For exam-
ple, a quasi contract would exist in cases where the patient was una-
ble to consent because of the circumstances surrounding his or her
admission, as in the case of admission for an emergency medical
condition.28  For patients who are covered by in-network health in-
surance29 that the hospital chooses to accept,30 the exact nature of
the contractual obligation created with the hospital is usually not
relevant to the financial obligation incurred by the patient; the
terms of the patient’s contract with the hospital (whether express,
implied-in-fact, or quasi) are usually superseded by the agreement
between the patient’s health insurer and the hospital.31
For the increasing number of patients who are self-pay,32 how-
ever, the exact nature of the contract entered into with the hospital
is of critical importance because it will determine the rights and ob-
ligations between the patient and the hospital, including   the
amount that the patient is obligated to pay for the care received.33
28. See, e.g., infra pp. 12–13 (discussing the case of Mr. Dennis, an emergency
patient).
29. Health insurance is considered to be “in-network” when the health insur-
ance company has entered into a contract with the hospital pursuant to which the
hospital has agreed to accept specific reimbursement amounts as full payment for
treatment of insured patients.  A very important benefit to the patient from receiv-
ing treatment in-network is that the hospital has agreed to accept the insurance
payment as full payment and not to seek any additional amount from the patient.
If a patient is covered by health insurance, but that health insurance is not in-
network with the hospital that provided treatment, then the hospital is free to bill
the patient for the difference between the hospital’s excessive CDM based charges
and the reimbursement amount received from the patient’s health insurance. This
practice is called balance billing.
30. Hospitals, in order to increase profits, sometimes refuse to submit a pa-
tient’s bill to the patient’s health insurance, even in cases where that insurance is
otherwise accepted by the hospital.  For example, if a Medicare patient presents at
a Medicare participating hospital and the patient’s injuries are the result of a mo-
tor vehicle accident, it is not uncommon for the hospital to refuse to submit the
patient’s bill to Medicare and instead file a hospital lien against the patient’s cause
of action against or settlement with the third-party who was responsible for the
accident. See generally Nation, Accident, supra note 6 (discussing this practice by
hospitals and suggesting ways to prevent it).
31. See Nation, Fair & Reasonable, supra note 1, at 443–446 (noting that hos-
pitals agree to accept the rates negotiated with in-network insurers as full payment
and not to bill the insured patients for any additional amounts beyond the co-pays,
co-insurance, and deductible amounts for which patients are responsible pursuant
to their health insurance policy).
32. See Nation, Fair & Reasonable, supra note 1, at 430 (defining self-pay
patients).
33. See infra Part II.A, II.B.
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Self-pay patients include patients who are uninsured, patients who
are insured but receive care out-of-network (“OON patients”), or
patients who have their in-network insurance rejected by the hospi-
tal because the injuries being treated were the result of a third-
party’s negligence, such as a patient who was the victim of a motor
vehicle accident.34  In these cases, there is either no superseding
contract between the hospital and the patient’s health insurer, or
the hospital chooses to ignore the superseding contract and treat an
insured in-network patient as uninsured.35
Practically speaking, this means that the price that self-pay pa-
tients owe the hospital can vary significantly depending on the type
and interpretation of the contract the self-pay patient entered into
with the hospital.36  Hospitals typically claim that self-pay patients
owe the exorbitant CDM-based price, but, depending on the appli-
cation of contract law, the patient may be responsible to pay only
the reasonable market value of the medical care received, which is
much lower than the excessive CDM price.37
As noted, in the case of self-pay patients, hospitals claim that
they have a right to be paid their exorbitant CDM prices.38  This
claim is often based on the patient’s signature on the admission
agreement.  Consider, for example, the following facts taken from a
recent Virginia case39:
[Glenn] Dennis arrived at Carter Bank and Trust, his place of
employment, on May 29, 2014.  Karen Pratt, Misty Powell, and
Kathy Gravely, Mr. Dennis’s coworkers, stated that Mr. Dennis
was not functioning normally on that day.  Ms. Pratt testified that
Mr. Dennis was “not focusing, not concentrating . . . [and] fidg-
ety.”  She believed Mr. Dennis to be distracted from his work,
upset and scared.  Ms. Powell similarly stated that Mr. Dennis
appeared “very upset.  His face was kind of flushed.  His eyes
were kind of watery.  He seemed very fidgety.  He couldn’t seem
to concentrate.”  Ms. Gravely’s testimony was consistent with the
34. See Nation, Fair & Reasonable, supra note 1, at 430 (defining self-pay
patients).
35. Id.
36. See infra Part II.B.
37. See infra Parts IV, V.
38. See Nation, Fair and Reasonable, supra note 1, at 430.
39. Dennis v. PHC-Martinsville, Inc., 93 Va. Cir. 111, 112–13 (Va. Cir. Ct.
2016).  On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that the circuit court
erred in ruling that the hospital failed to prove mutual assent to the contract and as
a result reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court and remanded the case to the
Circuit Court for findings related to the patient’s affirmative defenses. See PHC-
Martinsville, Inc. v. Dennis, No. 161019, 2017 WL 40533898, at *2–3 (Va. Sept. 14,
2017) (Dennis II).
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other witnesses, as she stated Mr. Dennis “was very agitated.  I
could see in his demeanor, his expression, there was some pain in
his face. He acknowledged that he was having chest pain’s that
were like he had had before [during a previous heart attack].”
Ms. Gravely did not trust Mr. Dennis to be in the bank that day,
and Ms. Pratt drove him to Urgent Care because she did not
think Mr. Dennis capable of driving himself.
Mr. Dennis was seen by medical personnel at an Urgent Care
facility, where he was joined by Patricia Dennis, his wife, who
testified that Mr. Dennis was “crying . . . upset . . . [and] agi-
tated.”  The staff at Urgent Care quickly determined that Mr.
Dennis should be transferred to the hospital.  Mr. Dennis arrived
at Memorial Hospital in an ambulance, in acute emotional and
physical distress.  Throughout this ordeal, Mr. Dennis was suffer-
ing from chest pains similar to those he had experienced while
having a heart attack some years earlier.  Nitroglycerin did not
seem to relieve his pain, and Mr. Dennis was agitated, tearful,
illogical, less-than-normally coherent, and fearful.
Some 45 minutes after Mr. Dennis arrived at the hospital, Vir-
ginia Ramsey, a hospital registrar, brought papers for him to sign.
He was lying prone in a room in the emergency department, and
monitors were attached to his person.  He had undergone a pre-
liminary assessment by the medical staff.  Mr. Dennis believed he
was having a severe heart attack and, as he lay there, began to
fear that he was going to die.  (In testimony, he employed euphe-
misms to say so: he said he hoped he would not “go away,” and
wondered “what would be left behind.”)  He was eager for treat-
ment to begin.
Ms. Dennis, who was in the room while Ms. Ramsey was there,
testified that, while she did not recall Ms. Ramsey’s exact words,
their essence, as she understood it, was that these were the pa-
pers that Mr. Dennis had to sign in order to be treated.  She also
testified that Mr. Dennis was unable to concentrate or read when
given the consent form to sign.  Ms. Ramsey (who does not spe-
cifically recall Mr. Dennis or this occasion) testified that her
habit or practice is simply to tell the patient that by signing these
documents he gives the hospital permission to treat him, verifies
the information that the hospital has about him, and guarantees
that his bills will be paid.  She does not read the documents to the
patient.
Mr. Dennis testified that, though he does not specifically recall
Ms. Ramsey, he knew the hospital wanted him to sign something,
and he wanted to “move on so I could get treated.”  Ms. Ramsey
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was in the room for an estimated two minutes.  Mr. Dennis
signed the documents that she had brought.
An important question addressed by this article is what impact,
if any, circumstances like those surrounding Glenn Dennis’s signing
of the hospital’s admission agreement should have on the enforce-
ability of hospital/patient contracts.40  Specifically, when an admis-
sion agreement is signed by a patient in the emergency department,
should the court blindly apply the doctrine of objective intent and
enforce the writing simply because it was signed?41  Or, should the
court refuse to enforce the admission agreement because a patient
like Mr. Dennis is in no position to give free and knowing assent to
the agreement’s terms?42  Alternatively, should the court find some
middle ground, such as reviewing the agreement with special scru-
tiny to make sure that the terms are fair?43
In addition, in the context of both emergency and non-emer-
gency admissions, the admission agreement presented to patients is
a contract of adhesion.44  That is, patients have no ability to negoti-
ate the terms of the admission agreement.  Rather, patients are
40. See, e.g., St. John’s Episcopal Hosp. v. McAdoo, 405 N.Y.S.2d 935, 936
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1978).  The court recognized the trauma and anxiety experienced by
those confronted with an emergency medical crisis and concluded that a hospital
emergency room is certainly not a place where a reasonable person could be ex-
pected to exercise “calm and dispassionate judgment.” Id.  According to the court,
a reasonable person would give a hospital admission contract at most “cursory
attention.” Id.  The court concluded that a hospital “should not be permitted to
enforce a contractual obligation entered into under such tension-laden circum-
stances.” Id. See also infra Part II.A.
41. See Dennis II, 2017 WL 4053898, at *1.  The Supreme Court of Virginia
engaged in a blind application of the doctrine to reverse the Circuit Court’s hold-
ing that no mutual assent existed stating:  “[C]ontrary to the circuit court’s ruling,
the evidence established the Dennis assented to the terms of the contract. Whatever
Dennis’s unexpressed intentions may have been, his signature on the contract was
clearly a manifestation of his intent to agree to its terms.” Id. at *2 (emphasis ad-
ded). See also infra notes 79–140 and accompanying text.
42. See Dennis II, 2017 WL 4053898, at *1–4 (holding that under the circum-
stances of the case the parties held that no mutual assent and thus no contract
existed). infra notes 79–140 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Phx. Baptist Hosp. & Med. Ctr., v. Aiken, 877 P.2d 1345, 1349
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that in a contract of adhesion only provisions within
the reasonable expectations of the parties under the circumstances should be en-
forced); McAdoo, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 938; infra notes 79–140 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Banner Health v. Medical Savings Insurance Co., 163 P.3d 1096,
1108 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (Kessler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The opinion stated:
The contracts in this case [Conditions of Admission (COAs) signed by the
patients] were clearly contracts of adhesion. Contracts of adhesion are
generally fully enforceable according to their terms. Courts will not, how-
ever, enforce a contract or a term of a contract if the contract or term
exceeds a party’s reasonable expectations. Additionally, as a matter of
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presented with a “take-it or leave-it” situation where they must ei-
ther sign the admission agreement presented to them by the hospi-
tal or, in the non-emergency context, seek care elsewhere.45  What
equity, the courts will not enforce a contract or a term thereof if it is
unconscionable.
According to the “reasonable expectation” rule, while a party is typically
bound by the terms of an adhesion contract even when they do not know
the details of the terms of the contract, they are not bound by the un-
known terms of the contract that are beyond the range of reasonable ex-
pectation. A term may be deemed to exceed the party’s reasonable
expectation when the party enforcing the term has reason to believe the
party against whom the agreement is enforced would not have accepted
the agreement had he or she known the agreement contained that term.
In determining whether a party enforcing an agreement had reason to
believe the term exceeded the other party’s reasonable expectations,
courts may examine factors including: whether the term is bizarre or op-
pressive, whether the term eviscerates non-standard terms specifically
agreed to, whether the term eliminates the dominant purpose of the con-
tract, whether the other party had an opportunity to read the term, and
whether the term is illegible or otherwise hidden from view.
Id.
But even if the provision in question does not exceed the parties’ reasonable ex-
pectations this does not end the inquiry. The opinion went on to state that:
Courts may refuse to enforce a term within a party’s reasonable expecta-
tions if that term is unconscionable. A contract or term therein may be
procedurally unconscionable — wrong in the bargaining process-or sub-
stantively unconscionable — wrong in the contract terms per se. A con-
tract may be deemed procedurally unconscionable when it is entered into
hastily and/or in an emergency situation, when its terms are not explained
at the time it is signed, and when the document does not call attention to
terms to be enforced against the signing party. Indications of substantive
unconscionability include gross disparity in the values exchanged, unduly
oppressive terms, and overall imbalance in the rights and protections of
the parties. . . .
In opposition to Banner’s motion for summary judgment . . . the patients
argued the price terms of the COAs were unconscionable. In support of
this argument, the patients. . . stat[ed] that they signed the COAs in emer-
gency situations, while they were under stress caused by their medical
conditions. . . . Several of the patients stated in their affidavits that the
COAs were not explained to them by the hospital personnel when they
signed them, and that they believed that signing the COAs was a prereq-
uisite to treatment. Furthermore, Banner’s Vice President of Finance, in-
dicated that the cost-to-charge ratio for some medical treatments at
Banner hospitals was as low as 19.77% [this means that the lowest mark-
up with respect to CDM prices was about 500%].
These facts raise at least the specter of unconscionability as to the price
terms in the COAs.
Id. at 1109 (citations omitted). See also Nation, Obscene Contracts, supra note 2, at
127–28 (discussing “planned” as opposed to “emergency” medical services and
concluding that admissions agreements signed in both cases are adhesive contracts
that are procedurally unconscionable); infra notes 225–249 and accompanying text.
45. Emergency patients cannot be turned away by the hospital regardless of
their ability to pay or their refusal to sign the hospital’s admission agreement.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\124-1\DIK103.txt unknown Seq: 15 10-OCT-19 8:44
2019] CONTRACTING FOR HEALTHCARE 105
impact should the adhesive nature of hospital admission agree-
ments have on their enforceability?46  Of particular interest in this
article is the enforceability of the price term contained in these
agreements.47
Consider these additional facts from the Dennis case:
The hospital bases its contract claim on the “Financial Responsi-
bility Agreement” that Mr. Dennis signed in the emergency de-
partment.  The fourth numbered paragraph of this document
says, in part, that the patient is “obligated to promptly pay the
hospital in accordance with the charges listed in the hospital’s
charge description master and, if applicable, the hospital’s charity
care and discount policies and state and federal law.”  The same
paragraph contains an acknowledgement that “except where pro-
hibited by law, the financial responsibility for the services ren-
dered belongs to [Dennis, the patient].”
The financial responsibility agreement is a form document, pre-
pared by the hospital, and presented by a hospital employee to
all patients (or, for those not capable of signing, their representa-
tives), to be signed before treatment is rendered. According to
counsel for the hospital, “[t]he terms of the FRA [financial re-
sponsibility agreement] signed by Mr. Dennis are the same as
However, many emergency patients do not realize that this regulation exists and
often believe that they must sign the forms presented to them in order to receive
treatment. See Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA),
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012) (requiring hospital emergency departments to medically
screen every patient who seeks emergency care and to stabilize or transfer those
with medical emergencies, regardless of health insurance status or ability to pay);
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985, 42 U.S.C.
§ 403 (West 2010); (EMTALA) Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act, AM. COLL. EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, https://bit.ly/2RdnK3C [https://perma
.cc/XC57-PKEE] (last visited Jul. 14, 2019); infra notes 225–237 and accompanying
text.
46. See supra note 49 at x; infra notes 79–189 and accompanying text.
47. In Doe v. HCA Health Servs. of Tenn., 46 S.W. 3d 191 (Tenn. 2001), the
Tennessee Supreme Court held that, by failing to refer to the chargemaster rates in
the agreement the price term was left open. Id. at 197. The court then held that,
given that indefiniteness, a court would have to determine the price term by the
quasi-contractual remedy of quantum meruit, that is, the reasonable value of the
services provided. Id. at 198–99. But see Allen v. Clarian Health Partners, 980
N.E. 2d 306 (Ind. 2012) (finding that the phrase “the undersigned guarantees pay-
ment of the account” was a clear and definite reference to chargemaster rates and
therefore the admissions agreement was not missing a price term and thus there
was no need to impute a reasonable price); Holland v. Trinity Health Care, 791
N.W. 2d 724, (Mich. App. 2010) (concluding the phrase “usual and customary
charges” in hospital’s contract with a patient “unambiguously refers to the ‘Charge
Master’”); Shelton v. Duke Univ. Health Sys. Inc., 633 S.E. 2d 113,114 (N.C. App.
2006) (finding the language “regular rates and terms of the Hospital” not to be an
open price term where the prices were set forth in the hospital’s chargemaster).
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those of every other patient agreement in the same timeframe—
whether elective or emergency, whether inpatient or
outpatient.”48
Notice that there is no actual price (dollars and cents amount)
included in the agreement.  This omission is very common and, at
least in the context of emergency admissions, is understandable; at
the time of admission, neither the hospital nor the patient knows at
this time the full extent of medical care that will be needed to treat
the patient.49  However, it is neither understandable nor fair that
this ambiguous pricing language is used to justify charging the pa-
tient many times the amount that the hospital receives from the
majority of its patients for identical care.  Until recently, most hos-
pitals treated their CDM as proprietary and refused to reveal it to
anyone, including patients.  Even now when patients do have access
to the CDM, patients still do not know how much the admission
agreement is asking them to pay.50
For example, in the Dennis case the court notes that the hospi-
tal charged Mr. Dennis $111,115.37 based on its CDM.51  By con-
trast, an in-network commercial insurer like Anthem would have
paid a mere $23,389.00 pursuant to the rates negotiated between
the insurer and the hospital for the exact treatment that Mr. Dennis
received.52  Similarly, had Mr. Dennis been covered by Medicare,
the government would have reimbursed approximately
$20,000.00.53  In other words, Mr. Dennis was charged, based on his
signature on the FRA, at least 4.75 times the amount that insured
patients would have paid!  It is important to note that even though
commercial insurance companies may provide some benefits to hos-
pitals that self-pay patients do not provide, such as access to an in-
creased volume of patients and quick and assured bill payment, the
expense to the hospital of treating a patient is exactly the same re-
gardless of whether the patient has private insurance, commercial
insurance, or no insurance.
Mr. Dennis was in fact covered by commercial insurance, but
his insurance was out-of-network—his insurance company had not
48. Dennis v. PHC-Martinsville, Inc., 93 Va. Cir. 111, 113 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2016).
49. See, e.g., DiCarlo v. St. Mary Hosp., 530 F.3d 255, 264 (3d Cir. 2008)
(holding that omitting a specific dollar figure is the only practical way in which the
obligations of the patient to pay can be set forth, given the fact that nobody yet
knows just what condition the patient has, and what treatments will be necessary
to remedy what ails him or her).
50. See infra notes 56–60 and accompanying text.
51. See Dennis, 93 Va. Cir. at 114, 119.
52. Id. at 120.
53. Id. at 119–20.
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entered into a contract with the hospital where Mr. Dennis was
treated.54  Mr. Dennis’s insurance company did actually pay the
hospital $27,254.95.  However, because there was no contract be-
tween the hospital and his insurance company, the hospital claimed
it was not required to accept the insurance company’s payment as
payment in full and billed Mr. Dennis for $83,860.42, the difference
between the hospital’s CDM based rate and the amount received
from Mr. Dennis’s insurer.55
This article focuses on the application of contract law princi-
ples to the relationship between hospitals and self-pay patients to
determine how much self-pay patients owe the hospital for the
health care they have received.56  For example, in the case of Mr.
Dennis, should his signature on the FRA legally bind him to pay
the hospital’s chargemaster rates?57  This article argues, based on
the proper application of contract law principles, that Mr. Dennis
must pay only the reasonable market-based value of the health care
that he received (about $27,000.00).58  Moreover, the determination
of reasonable value must be based on the market value—the actual
54. Id. at 119.
55. Id.  This is commonly referred to as balance billing. See infra notes 6–14
and accompanying text; Tara Bannow, Hospitals’ Solution to Surprise Out-of-Net-
work Bills: Make Physicians Go In-Network, MODERN HEALTHCARE  (Jan. 12,
2019, 12:00 AM), https://bit.ly/32qdmel [https://perma.cc/QU5U-L8DA] (discussing
hospitals adopting a policy of requiring in-hospital physician groups to contract
with the same insurance carriers as the hospital in response to patient complaints
about receiving surprise balance bills).
56. See Christopher N. Osher, A Denver-area Hospital Sued a Patient for
Nearly $230,000 Over Her Surgery Bill. A Jury Said Not So Fast, DENVER POST
(June 29, 2018, 10:07 AM), https://dpo.st/2Kyge2E [https://perma.cc/X2W5-LJ3C]
(discussing the case of Lisa French who underwent spinal-fusion surgery in 2014
and was sued by the hospital three years later for $229,112.13, but a jury found that
the bills were unreasonable). According to the jury’s special verdict form, the jury
found that Lisa French had entered into a contract with the hospital to pay “all
charges of the hospital not otherwise paid by my health insurance or other payor”.
The jury decided that the phrase “all charges of the hospital” did not refer to the
predetermined charges for goods and services contained in the hospital’s
chargemaster, but instead referred to the reasonable value of the goods and ser-
vices provided to Ms. French. The jury found specifically that the hospital’s CDM
rates were not reasonable. The hospital’s bill based on CDM rates was $303,709.49
and Ms. French’s out-of-network insurer paid $74,597.35.  The jury found that Ms.
French owed the hospital and additional $766.74 more than half of which was the
unpaid portion of her deductible. (Cite to Jury Form) (on file with author).
57. Id.  See also infra notes 79–189 and accompanying text.
58. This amount is derived as follows: assuming the Anthem rate is about
equal to the average commercial insurer reimbursement rate then this would be
increased by 10 to 15 percent to account for the benefits that commercial insurers
provide to providers that self-pay patients do not. Thus, $23,389 X 1.10 = $25,728
and $23,389 x 1.15 = $26,897. See infra notes 225–249 and accompanying text.
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reimbursements that the hospital receives—and not on the hospi-
tals unilaterally-set CDM prices.59
In the case of self-pay patients who enter the hospital through
the emergency department, they, like Mr. Dennis, usually simply
lack capacity to contract due to rushed, stressful, and tension-laden
emergency circumstances.60  As a result, most contracts signed by
patients in the emergency department are not enforceable and the
obligation of these patients to pay for the medical care they have
received is based on quasi contract.61
With respect to patients who enter the hospital other than
through the emergency department, the admission agreements they
sign, like those signed by emergency patients, are adhesion con-
tracts—often called leonine, standard, or form contracts—
presented to patients on a take-it or leave-it basis.62  As a result,
even in a non-emergency context where the patient is capable of
giving assent, true assent by the patient is lacking, and the courts
must closely scrutinize such contracts to ensure that the weaker
party, the patient, is not taken advantage of by the stronger party,
the hospital.63  A hospital exercising its prodigious bargaining
power to extract a promise from a self-pay patient to pay more than
300 percent of the price the hospital usually receives and accepts for
the same services from the majority of its patients is a prime exam-
ple of a grossly unfair term that courts should refuse to enforce.64
This article concludes that the misapplication of contract law
principles in cases involving hospitals and self-pay patients  has ef-
fectively resulted in hospitals price-gouging self-pay patients.65
Under the application of contract law principles argued for here,
self-pay patients should rarely be obligated to pay more than a rea-
sonable market-based value for the healthcare they receive.66  Fi-
nally, if courts apply contract law as suggested here to cases
59. The U. S. Congress has taken notice that CDM prices do not reflect mar-
ket forces. Thus, the ACA requires tax-exempt hospitals to collect from low in-
come uninsured patients not more than the amount generally billed to individuals
with insurance.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 § 9007(a), 26
U.S.C. § 501(r)(5)(A) (2016).  This is discussed in Nation Fair & Reasonable, supra
note 1 at 467–470). See also infra notes 190–224 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 225–237 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 225–237 and accompanying text.  Also, there may be no
consideration and thus no contract when a hospital provides stabilizing treatment
to a patient in an emergency. See infra notes 235–237 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 49 and infra notes 79–140 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 49 and infra notes 79–140 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 49 and infra notes 79–140 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 52 and infra notes 225–249 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 225–249 and accompanying text.
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involving hospitals and self-pay patients, it will help to ameliorate
excessive health care prices which are one of the most significant
causes of exorbitant healthcare costs in the United States.67
This article begins with a discussion of the basic contract law
principles that are relevant to contracts formed between hospitals
and patients.68  Next, the article discusses why admission agree-
ments and their common price-formula terms are usually unen-
forceable.69  This discussion is followed by a analysis of why self-
pay patients are obligated, pursuant to either an implied-in-fact
contract or a quasi contract, to pay the hospital a reasonable mar-
ket-based price for the healthcare they receive.70  The next section
includes a brief summary of other work by the author outlining the
process courts should use to calculate the fair and reasonable price
for health care received by self-pay patients.71  Finally, the article
concludes by arguing that the proper application of contract law
principles by courts can help to solve the pressing problem of hospi-
tals demanding exorbitant prices from self-pay patients.72
67. See Gerard F. Anderson et. al., It’s Still the Prices, Stupid: Why the US
Spends So Much on Health Care, And A Tribute to Uwe Reinhardt, 38 HEALTH
AFF. 87, 87–95 (2019) (concluding in part that the sizable differences in health
spending between the US and other countries were explained mainly by health
care prices); Zack Cooper et. al., The Price Ain’t Right? Hospital Prices and Health
Spending on the Privately Insured, 134 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 51, 51–107 (2018)
(finding that the commercial prices among US health care providers varied within
regions, across regions, and within hospitals, and that variation in providers’ prices
explained a large-share of the three-fold variation in commercial health spending
across the US, and also found that hospital mergers raised prices and that hospitals
in concentrated markets had higher prices and were able to negotiate more
favorable payment terms with insurers).; Michael Batty & Benedic Ippolito, Mys-
tery of the Chargemaster: Examining the Role of Hospital List Prices in What Pa-
tients Actually Pay, 36 HEALTH AFF. 689, 689–696 (2017) (reasoning that even
though most patients do not pay hospital chargemaster prices, these excessive
prices still can drive up health spending and increase hospital revenue).
68. See infra notes 79–189 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 190–224 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 225–249 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 250–314 and accompanying text.
72. See infra note 314 and following text.
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I. BACKGROUND: CONTRACT LAW IN HOSPITAL/PATIENT
CONTRACTING
A. Freedom of Contract, Mutual Assent, Objective Intent & The
Duty to Read
Contract law is the law of voluntary agreement.73  No one may
force another to enter into a contract; each party must knowingly
and freely choose to enter into the contract.74  The law of con-
tracts—its rules and doctrines—must always reflect this fundamen-
tal principle.75  The doctrine of freedom of contract provides that
contracting parties are free to mutually assent to any terms they
desire, within the parameters established by the law.  Thus, the pri-
mary role of the courts, when they are convinced that mutual assent
has been given, is to enforce agreements voluntarily made by the
parties.76
The fundamental necessity of mutual assent begs the question
of how courts are to determine, in specific cases, whether the requi-
site assent exists?  Part of the answer to this question is found in the
requirements that courts consider essential to the creation of a valid
and enforceable contract.77  These requirements include offer and
73. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§§ 1-3 to 1-4 (2d ed. 1977) (discussing freedom of contract and the philosophical
foundation of contract law, respectively).
74. Id. at § 1-3 (“Most of Contract law is premised upon a model consisting of
two alert individuals, mindful of their self-interest, hammering out an agreement
by a process of hard bargaining.”).
75. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST.
1981) § 17 (the formation of a contract requires a bargaining in which there is a
manifestation of mutual assent).
76. See, e.g., Mark Klock, Unconscionability and Price Discrimination, 69
TENN. L. REV. 317, 343 (2002).
The consideration can be as nominal as a peppercorn for the agreement
to be legally enforceable.  Courts do not inquire into the distribution of
benefits between the parties.  This legal fact is deeply rooted in a strong
faith in the efficiency of free markets.  Individuals do not voluntarily
enter into agreements that they expect to make them worse off than
before the agreement.  If the agreement was made voluntarily, everyone
is presumed to have been made better off by the agreement.  This pre-
sumption can be justified by economic thought which, given a few simple
axioms, demonstrates that markets will channel resources to their most
valued use and maximize society’s wealth when all market participants
are permitted to freely make their own decisions.  Government interven-
tion cannot improve the allocation of resources and can even impede it.
Id. at 343–44 (citations omitted).
77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 9–94 (AM. LAW INST.
1981) (discussing formation of contracts).
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acceptance, consideration, capacity of the contracting parties, and a
legal contract objective.78
Generally, to have a valid contract, there must first be an of-
fer.79  An offer exists when one party communicates to another the
intent to contract by indicating a willingness to exchange one thing
for another according to reasonably definite and certain terms.80
The requirement of reasonably definite and certain terms means
that the parties must agree on all of the essential terms related to
their contract so that the court can properly enforce the parties’
agreement.81  Acceptance requires the person who received the of-
fer to communicate his intent to enter into a contract on the exact
terms offered.82  The requirement of consideration, reflecting the
importance of the economic function served by contracts, requires
that the parties have agreed to a bargained-for-exchange for some-
thing of value.83  An individual has the capacity to enter into a con-
tract if, at the time of contracting, the individual can understand in
a reasonable manner the nature and consequences of the
transaction.84
While the foregoing requirements help to establish what the
law means by mutual assent in the context of contracts, contract law
also relies heavily on the concepts of agreement and intent.85  Thus,
courts must determine the intent of the parties and whether they
have agreed on the necessary terms of the contract.86  Contract law
plays an important modern role in facilitating the operation of our
economy based on free market capitalism.  Consequently, in the in-
terest of certainty and predictability, the law determines contractual
78. Id. §§ 24–94.
79. Id. §§ 24–34.
80. Id. §§ 24, 33.
81. Id. § 33.
82. Id. §§ 50–70.
83. Id. §§ 71–94.
84. Id. § 15.
(1) A person incurs only voidable contractual duties by entering into a
transaction if by reason of mental illness or defect (a) he is unable to
understand in a reasonable manner the nature and consequences of the
transaction, or (b) he is unable to act in a reasonable manner in relation
to the transaction and the other party has reason to know of his
condition.
Id. Comment c. states: “Age, bodily infirmity or disease, use of alcohol or drugs,
and illiteracy may bolster other evidence of incompetency.” (emphasis added). Id.
at § 15 cmt. c.
85. See supra notes 82–89 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 80.
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intent by using the concept of objective intent as a proxy for actual,
subjective intent.87
Under the doctrine of objective intent, a party’s actual, subjec-
tive intent is deemed to be consistent with that party’s objective
manifestations as interpreted by a reasonable person.88  The unex-
pressed, hidden, or secret intentions of a party are irrelevant to the
determination of objective intent precisely because the other party
is unaware of them.89  When determining objective intent, the law
instead looks at a person’s conduct and interprets its meaning from
of the perspective of a reasonable person dealing with that per-
son.90  In other words, in the context of contracts, the law concludes
that a patient’s intent is the same as the intent that a hypothetical
reasonable person in the hospital’s position and endowed with the
same knowledge as the hospital would ascribe to the patient.91
Under the objective theory of contracts, a person is bound by the
impression that he or she reasonably creates, even if he or she had
an unexpressed intent that was different.92
In the context of negotiated voluntary agreements, where two
parties of relatively equal bargaining power and knowledge confer
back and forth and finally come to an agreement, the justness of the
objective intent doctrine is virtually unassailable.93  Contract law
87. See, e.g., CALAMARI & PERILLO supra note 73 at § 2-2  (discussing objec-
tive and subjective intention).
A party’s intention will be held to be what a reasonable man in the posi-
tion of the other party would conclude his manifestations to mean.  By
testing the meaning to be given to a party’s words from the point of view
of the reasonable man in the second party’s position, the subjective ele-
ment of this party’s particular knowledge is incorporated into the objec-
tive test.  In other words, the test considers what the second party knows
or should know about the intention of the first party.
The objective theory is strongly supported by those who place the basis of
contract law upon the promisee’s justified reliance upon a promise or
upon the needs of society and trade.  An objective test is believed to pro-
tect “the fundamental principle of the security of business transactions.”
Even those who espouse intention as the basis of contract obligations are
generally willing to hold a promisor to the reasonable meaning of his
words, basing such liability on a theory of negligence, but are inclined to
wish that the objective theory be held on a short leash, and to allow sub-








93. A negotiated contract is the type that courts have traditionally had in
mind when developing the rules of contract law.  As noted by John D. Calamari
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could not function effectively if it was necessary to be concerned
with the possible unexpressed or secret intentions of the party with
whom one was doing business.94
However, in the context of contracts of adhesion, the validity
of the conclusions drawn from the objective intent doctrine may be
suspect and rote application of the doctrine may fail to produce just
results.95  The hallmarks of a contract of adhesion are unequal bar-
gaining power between the contracting parties, an imbalance of
knowledge that favors the party who drafted the agreement or oth-
erwise dictated the terms of the agreement, and an inability of the
weaker a party to meaningfully negotiate the terms of the agree-
ment.96  The result of these characteristics is that the weaker party
is faced with a take-it or leave-it situation;97 the weaker party must
either agree to the terms demanded by the stronger party, find a
different seller who is willing to negotiate, or do without the goods
or services in question.98  Theoretically, it would be possible for the
weaker party to seek the goods or services from another seller more
amenable to negotiation.  Practically, however, locating alternative
and Joseph M. Perillo in The Law of Contracts, “[M]ost of contract law is premised
upon the model consisting of two alert individuals, mindful of their self-interest,
hammering out an agreement buy a process of hard bargaining.” Supra note 73 at
§ 1-3.  Those authors also note that there has been increasing recognition and legal
literature that the bargaining process has become more limited modern society.
Id.
94. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 73 at § 2-2 (noting that an objec-
tive test is believed to “protect the fundamental principle of the security of busi-
ness transactions”).
95. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 73 at § 9-44 (“There has been a ten-
dency, particularly in recent years, to treat contracts of adhesion or standard form
contracts differently from other contracts.”); see also Banner Health v. Med. Sav.
Ins. Co., 163 P.3d 1016, 1104 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (Kessler, J., dissenting in part).
96. See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943).
The weaker party, in need of the goods or services, is frequently not in a
position to shop around for better terms, either because the author of the
standard contract has a monopoly (natural or artificial) or because all
competitors use the same clauses. . . . [C]ontractual intention is but a
subjection more or less voluntary to terms dictated by the stronger party,
terms whose consequences are often understood only in a vague way, if at
all.
Id.; Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
The term ‘adhesion contract’ refers to standardized contract forms of-
fered to consumers of goods and services on essentially a ‘take it or leave
it’ basis without affording the consumer a realistic opportunity to bargain
and under such conditions that the consumer cannot obtain the desired
product or services except by acquiescing in the form contract.
Id.
97. See supra note 102. [?]
98. Id.
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services is not possible because the same considerations that gave
rise to the contract of adhesion in the first instance usually result in
all sellers of such goods or services presenting customers with very
similar contracts of adhesion.99
In the case of hospitals and patients, hospitals argue that the
offer is contained in the admission agreement presented to the pa-
tient.  Thus, when the patient signs the agreement, hospitals con-
tend that the patient has assented to the terms of the agreement.
Consideration is argued to be the hospital’s promise to give health
care in exchange for the patients promise to pay for the care pursu-
ant to the terms outlined in the admission agreement.  However,
the question becomes what to make of the hospital’s claim that the
patient—the weaker party—has objectively agreed to the terms dic-
tated by the hospital—the stronger party?100  Is this claimed objec-
tive agreement indicative of real assent by the patient?101
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of Phx., Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013, 1017
(Ariz. 1992) (concerning an agreement to arbitrate included in the admissions doc-
uments provided to a patient at a clinic).  In Broemmer, the court cited with ap-
proval the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 211 (Standardized
Agreements): “Although customers typically adhere to standardized agreements
and are bound by them without even appearing to know the standard terms in
detail, they are not bound to unknown terms which are beyond the range of rea-
sonable expectation.” Id.  Further, the court concluded that “[c]ontracts of adhe-
sion will not be enforced unless they are conscionable and within the reasonable
expectations of the parties.” Id. at 1018.  It stated: “This is a well-established prin-
ciple of contract law; today we merely apply it to the undisputed facts of the case
before us.” Id. But see Rory v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 703 N. W. 2d 23, 35 (Mich. 2005)
(“An ‘adhesion contract’ is simply that: a contract. It must be enforced according
to its plain terms unless one of the traditional contract defenses applies.”). Rory
was a 4-3 decision; Justice Kelly in dissent, joined by two other dissenting Justices,
stated: “[T]he majority of the courts in this country has disavowed the strict con-
struction policy in construing contracts of adhesion.” Id. at 52 (Kelly, J.,
dissenting).
101. Regarding contracts of adhesion, that is contracts that are not negotiated
but instead prepared by the stronger party and presented to the weaker party on a
take it or leave it basis as a condition of treatment, at best the weaker party has
assented only to conscionable terms that are within the reasonable expectations of
the parties. See Broemmer, 840 P.2d at 1016.  The Restatement notes that stan-
dardized agreements are enforceable except where a “party [stronger party] has
reason to believe that the party manifesting . . . assent [weaker party] would not do
so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term . . . .” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 77 at § 211(3).  The Comment goes on to
state that: “Such a belief or assumption may be shown by prior negotiations or
inferred from the circumstances.  Reason to believe may be inferred from the fact
that the term is bizarre or oppressive . . . .” Id. at cmt. f.  In the context of hospital
admissions agreements, those signed in the Emergency Department are signed
under circumstances which would prevent a reasonable person from interpreting
the patient’s signature as a manifestation of assent. See infra notes 108–140 and
accompanying text.  Moreover, the price term contained in these agreements,
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\124-1\DIK103.txt unknown Seq: 25 10-OCT-19 8:44
2019] CONTRACTING FOR HEALTHCARE 115
When the weaker party signs a written contract of adhesion,
some courts have used—really misused—objective intent and a re-
lated concept, the duty to read,102 as excuses to enforce all of the
terms of the writing against the weaker party without first closely
examining those terms to ensure that the weaker party is not being
taken advantage of by the stronger party.103  Essentially, the duty to
read stands for the proposition that a party who signs a written con-
tract is bound by the party’s signature whether the party chose to
read the document or not.104  That is, a signature creates the im-
pression that the signer has agreed to all the terms contained in the
writing and, therefore, the signer is bound by that impression.105
The idea behind the duty to read rule is that without it, one could
not rely on a signed document because the party who signed it
could avoid the transaction by saying that he or she had not read it,
did not understand the writing, or secretly disagreed with its
terms.106
Like the objective intent doctrine, the duty to read concept
makes good sense in the context of negotiated contracts but may
produce pernicious consequences in the context of adhesion con-
tracts.107  This article and others argue that applying objective in-
tent and the duty to read in the context of contracts of adhesion is a
fundamental misapplication of the doctrine of freedom of con-
tract.108  As one court noted, “failure to read an instrument is not
whether signed in the emergency department or otherwise, is oppressive, requiring
the patient pay many times the market value of the care received.  As a result, no
properly informed patient who had a choice would ever agree to sign it. See infra
notes 190–203 and accompanying text.
102. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 73 at § 9-41 to 9-46.  Many com-
mentators have questioned the appropriateness of the doctrine in the context of
contracts of adhesion. See generally Charles L. Knapp, Is There a “Duty to
Read”?, 66 HASTINGS L. J. 1083 (2015); Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Read-
ing Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 545 (2014); Randy E.
Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 635 (2002); John
D. Calamari, Duty to Read—A Changing Concept, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 341
(1974); Stewart Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty to Read—Business Run
by IBM Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1051
(1966); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING AP-
PEALS 370 (1960).
103. See, e.g., Allen v. Clarian Health Partners, 980 N.E.2d 306 (Ind. 2012);
Holland v. Trinity Health Care, 791 N.W. 2d 724 (Mich. App. 2010); and Shelton v.
Duke Univ. Health Sys. Inc., 633 S.E. 2d 113, 114 (N.C. App. 2006).
104. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 73 at § 9-42.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. § 9-44.
108. See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 96 at 642.
[T]he “law” will [not] protect the public against any abuse of freedom of
contract . . . so long as we fail to realize that freedom of contract must
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negligence per se but must be considered in light of all surrounding
facts and circumstances.”109  The adhesive nature of the contract
and the context in which it is signed are very important facts and
circumstances indeed.110
For example, in the Dennis case discussed above, Mr. Dennis
signed the admission agreement and the other papers presented to
him by the hospital’s representative when he clearly was in no posi-
tion to read, understand, or negotiate the terms contained in those
writings.111  Moreover, even if he had attempted to negotiate the
terms of the agreement, the hospital’s representative who presented
the forms to Mr. Dennis did not have the authority to agree to
change the terms.112  To force Mr. Dennis to pay more than three
times the market value of the care received based solely on his sig-
nature on the admission agreement is a pernicious consequence.113
If a court finds that the rules associated with objective intent and
the duty to read dictate such a result then the court is misapplying
the rules.114
The correct (not rote) application of objective intent and the
duty to read would result in Mr. Dennis being liable to pay fair
market value for the care received and no more.115  For example,
the hypothetical reasonable person who is the focus of the objective
intent analysis is deemed to be aware to the same extent as the
actual contracting party—the hospital—of the circumstances sur-
mean different things for different types of contracts.  Its meaning must
change with the social importance of the type of contract and the degree
of monopoly enjoyed by the author of the standardized contract.
Id.
109. See Chandler v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 374 F.2d 129, 136 (4th Cir.
1967) (concerning a bill of lading).
110. See, e.g., St. John’s Episcopal Hosp. v. McAdoo, 405 N.Y.S.2d 935, 936
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1978) (“There are circumstances [the court was discussing an emer-
gency hospital admission and a signature on an admission agreement] under which
a reasonable person might sign a contract, without reading it or understanding it,
so that requiring adherence to its terms would be grossly unfair.”).  See also infra
note 113.
111. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 1–26 and accompanying text.
114. See Kessler supra note 96, at 640. When referring to the traditional appli-
cation of freedom of contract doctrine to contracts that are not negotiated con-
tracts—e.g., contracts of adhesion—Kessler stated: “Freedom of contract enables
enterprisers to legislate by contract and, what is even more important, to legislate
in a substantially authoritarian manner without using the appearance of authorita-
rian forms. Standard contracts in particular could thus become effective instru-
ments in the hands of powerful industrial and commercial overlords enabling them
to impose a new feudal order of their own making up on a vast host of vassals.” Id.
115. See infra notes 122–124 and accompanying text.
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rounding Mr. Dennis’s signing of the admissions agreement.  This is
because the objective intent doctrine places the hypothetical rea-
sonable person in the position of the other party—here, the hospi-
tal—and assumes that the hypothetical reasonable person has the
same specific knowledge as the actual contracting party.  In Mr.
Dennis’s case, the hospital was clearly aware that the documents
were signed in the emergency department by a patient who be-
lieved that he was having a heart attack and could die if treatment
was not provided quickly.116  As a result, it is likely that the hypo-
thetical reasonable person would conclude that Mr. Dennis’s signa-
ture indicates a desire to receive treatment rather than agreement
with any unusual or oppressive terms contained in the document.117
Specifically, Mr. Dennis’s signature would not be interpreted as his
assent to the payment formula that required him to pay an unrea-
sonable and excessive amount for his treatment.118
Under the correct application of the objective intent doctrine,
a hospital has a somewhat limited ability to contract with emer-
gency patients.119  The correct analysis suggests that emergency pa-
tients lack the ability to enter into a valid contract, or, at the very
least, that emergency patients lack the ability to agree to any unu-
sual or oppressive terms.120  Essentially, patients in the emergency
department lack, at least temporarily, the full capacity to contract
due to the emergency circumstances surrounding their admission to
the hospital.121
116. See CALAMARI AND PERILLO supra note 73 (1977) at §2-2 (“By testing
the meaning to be given to a party’s words from the point of view of the reasona-
ble man in the second party’s position, the subjective element of this party’s partic-
ular knowledge is incorporated into the objective test. In other words, the test




119. See supra notes 121–124 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 121–124 and accompanying text.
121. See CALAMARI AND PERILLO, supra note 73 at § 8-10 (noting other
forms of mental infirmity resulting in a loss of capacity such as temporary delirium
deriving from physical injuries sustained in accidents.) (notes omitted); Murray v.
Ready 292 P.2d 87, 88 (Colo. 1930) (noting that a person being in great pain and/or
being under the influence of drugs can help reach a conclusion that the person is
not competent to contract); see also Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of Phx., Ltd.,
840 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Ariz. 1992) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS, supra note 77 at 1016). It seems quite likely that a patient in the emer-
gency department, like Mr. Dennis, would have a difficult time understanding in a
reasonable manner the nature and consequences of the transaction. Moreover, the
hospital would certainly have reason to know the patient’s condition and that it
would renders a patient like Mr. Dennis unable to act in a reasonable manner in
relation to the transaction.
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This patient incapacity creates some limitations for the hospital
that the hospital may consider problematic.  But the solution is not
to misapply the doctrine of objective intent and, in so doing, treat
patients like Mr. Dennis unfairly.122  Moreover, the problem is not
one unique to the hospital setting but in fact is very common due to
the abundance of adhesion contracts in use today.123  For example,
when using the Internet it is common to encounter websites that
require the user to agree to the site’s terms and conditions before
proceeding.124  Typically, the user indicates their agreement by
placing a check in the box provided and hitting the enter key.125
However, these are clearly adhesion contracts because the user’s
only choice is to agree or disagree; there is no ability to negotiate
terms.126  Moreover, while the voluminous terms and conditions are
122. That is, by leaving patients like Mr. Dennis at the mercy of the hospital’s
demand for an exorbitant fee. Something that Mr. Dennis and every patient like
him would refuse to agree to if they had the knowledge and ability to do so.
123. See Sierra David Sterkin, Challenging Adhesion Contracts in California:
A Consumer’s Guide, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 285, 285 (2004) (“[A]dhesion
contracts are infused in the lives of all consumers.”).
124. See, e.g., TermsFeed, 5 Reasons Why You Need Terms and Conditions
(Jan. 14, 2019) https://bit.ly/2vGs81h [https://perma.cc/KVW8-YTT4] (noting that a
Terms and Conditions agreement is a set of regulations which users must agree to
follow in order to use a service. Terms of Use is often named Terms of Service,
Terms and Conditions, or Disclaimer when addressing website usage, and that it is
recommended to have a Terms and Conditions agreement for your website in order
to, prevent abuses, own your content, terminate accounts, limit liability, and set the
law that will govern any disputes).
125. See, e.g., TermsFeed, Add “I agree to terms” Checkbox (Mar. 29, 2017)
https://bit.ly/2YONVB3 [https://perma.cc/6YYL-RZGX] (It’s pretty clear that in-
cluding a Privacy Policy or a Terms and Conditions section on your website is im-
portant. However, it’s just as important to be able to enforce these legal agreements,
as they will do you no good if they’re found to be unenforceable. However, the most
recommended method to make these legal agreements enforceable is called the click-
wrap method. This method requires users to read and agree to the presented legal
agreement by making it mandatory to check a checkbox with the text “I Agree to
The Terms” or “I Agree To The Privacy Policy”).
126. See, e.g., Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110 (2012) (2d Cir. 2012).
The court refused to enforce an arbitration provision alleged to have been in-
cluded in the terms and conditions of the website and in the course of the opinion
stated:
To be sure, the “duty to read” rule combined with the “standardized
form” contract makes it unlikely in many contexts that a consumer will
actually read such an agreement beyond a quick scan, if that. A party who
makes regular use of a standardized form of agreement does not ordina-
rily expect his customers to understand or even read the standard terms.
One of the purposes of standardization is to eliminate bargaining over
details of individual transactions, and that purpose would not be served if
a substantial number of customers retained counsel and reviewed the
standard terms. But inasmuch as consumers are regularly and frequently
confronted with non-negotiable contract terms, particularly when enter-
ing into transactions using the Internet, the presentation of these terms at
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only a few clicks away, I suspect that many users simply do not
bother to read the terms and conditions, but simply check the box
so they can proceed.127  But, what are the owners of the website to
do in order to secure the user’s agreement to its desired terms and
conditions?128  Notwithstanding this dilemma, it seems unlikely that
a reasonable person would believe that the checked box indicates
that the user has agreed to any unusual, unexpected, unfair, or op-
pressive provisions, or even that the checked box indicates the
user’s willingness to take the risk that any such provisions may be
included in the terms and conditions.129
When dealing with contracts of adhesion, modern courts have
applied the doctrine of objective intent so that it indicates assent to
reasonable, conscionable, expected, or usual terms only.130  Mr.
Dennis’s signing of the agreement should, at most, be interpreted as
agreement only to terms and conditions that a hospital patient
would expect and that are fair, reasonable, and conscionable, rather
than agreement to any unexpected, unusual, unfair, or oppressive
terms.131  That is, those terms and conditions that typical hospital
patients would expect, rather than agreement to any unexpected,
unusual, unfair or oppressive terms.132  A full discussion of this
matter is not necessary here and is beyond the scope of this article.
The author has discussed in other work the issues involved in deter-
a place and time that the consumer will associate with the initial purchase
or enrollment, or the use of, the goods or services from which the recipi-
ent benefits at least indicates to the consumer that he or she is taking
such goods or employing such services subject to additional terms and
conditions that may one day affect him or her.




130. See CALAMARI AND PERILLO, supra note 73 at §9-46.  Thus, some of the
more modern cases search not only for apparent objective assessment but also for
a true assent. Under this view true accent does not exist unless there is a genuine
opportunity to read the clause in question and its impact is explained by the domi-
nant party and understood by the other party who has a reasonable choice under
the circumstances, of accepting or rejecting the clause. . . .  The Restatement (Sec-
ond) goes one step further when it indicates that what is important, at least in
contracts of adhesion, is whether a reasonable man would have expected to find
such a clause in the contract. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note
77 at 1016. The Restatement Second seems to be suggesting a new kind of objec-
tive approach to standardized agreements. Rather than seeking out true assent on
a case-by-case basis it places the duty upon the courts to consider the essential
fairness of the printed terms, both from the viewpoint of surprise and inherent
one-sidedness. Banner Health v. Med Sav. Ins. Co., 163 P.3d 1096, 1104 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2007) (Kessler, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
131. See Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of Phx., Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013 (1992).
132. See id. at 1016.
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mining whether CDM based prices are conscionable or unconscion-
able.133  With regard to emergency health care, legal recognition of
the full or partial inability of a patient seeking emergency care to
contract does not leave hospitals at a tremendous disadvantage.  As
discussed below, even when the hospital has no real contract with
the patient, the hospital will have the right under quasi contract to
recover the fair market value of the goods and services provided to
the patient.134
B. Types of Contracts: Quasi Contracts
Contracts may be entered into based on the parties’ words—
either written or oral—or actions.135  The law also recognizes a
cause of action for unjust enrichment under the doctrine of quasi
contract.  In a quasi contract, or an implied-in-law (as opposed to
an implied-in-fact) contract,136 the law imposes a contract-like duty
to prevent one party from being unjustly enriched (receiving a ben-
efit that in fairness the benefitted party should pay for) at the ex-
pense of another.137
133. See generally Nation, Obscene Contracts, supra note 2 (discussing the use
of the doctrine of unconscionability to prevent the enforcement of excessive
chargemaster prices against uninsured or out-of-network patients).
134. See, e.g., Bingham Mem’l Hosp. v. Boyd 8 P.3d 664 (Idaho Ct. App.
2000) (discussing medical services rendered to decedent who never signed the ad-
missions agreement, where the lower court found that the medical services pro-
vided to the decedent were necessary and voluntarily accepted, and that the
decedent was not admitted to the hospital against his will and finding an implied-
in-law contract obligating the decedent’s estate to pay the reasonable value of the
care provided and noting: where necessary and reasonable medical services are
rendered by a hospital and received by a patient, a contract implied in law is
formed to mandate remuneration) (citing Landmark Med. Ctr. v. Gauthier, 635
A.2d 1145 (R.I. 1994) (holding that an implied-in-law contract is formed when
medically necessary services are rendered even without mutual assent.))); Dennis
v. PHC-Martinsville, Inc., 93 Va. Cir. 111, 119 (Va. Cir. Ct.  2016) (“[E]ven if the
court finds—as it has—no express contract existing, Dennis is still obligated mine
implied contract to pay the reasonable value of the services rendered.”). See also
infra notes 225–237 and accompanying text.
135. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 79, § 1.12, at 19–20 (discussing
express, implied, and quasi contracts).
136. Id. See also, e.g., Boyd, 8 P.3d at 668; River Park Hosp., Inc. v.
BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., Inc., 173 S.W.3d 43, 57 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (dis-
cussing the fact that contracts can be either express, implied in fact or implied in
law and finding that when parties are forced to deal with each other and could not
come to an agreement an implied-in-law contract exists); Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc.
v. Healthcare Mgmt. Alts, Inc. 832 A.2d 501, 508 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (noting that
how much a hospital typically receives for its services is more probative of reasona-
ble value than its published rates).
137. See, e.g., Boyd, 8 P.3d at 669 (noting that such implied-in-law contracts
formed in order that a person needing help in an emergency and not able to ask for
it should obtain it, the attainment of such result being created by assuring compen-
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It is important to note that while both express and implied-in-
fact contracts are real contracts, a quasi contract is not a real con-
tract.138  That is, both express and implied-in-fact contracts require
mutual assent between the contracting parties.139  A quasi contract
lacks mutual assent, and thus it is not a contract.140  The term
“quasi contract” is a misnomer resulting from historical necessity.141
That is, the cause of action associated with unjust enrichment fit
more closely within contract law than tort law.142  As a result, the
word “contract” became associated with the doctrine.143  All three
types of contracts—express, implied-in-fact, and quasi—are rele-
vant to healthcare contracting.144
The law recognizes a quasi contract if three requirements are
met.145  First, there must be a benefit conferred on one party by
another.146  Second, the party receiving the benefit must retain and
be aware of the benefit.147  Third, and most importantly, the court
must be convinced that, under the circumstances, fairness and jus-
tice will be served by requiring the benefitted party to pay the other
sation to the person rendering aid) (citing Estate of Crisan, 107 N.W.2d 907 (Mich.
1961)).
138. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 73, § 1.12, at 19–20 (discussing
express, implied, and quasi contracts).
139. Id.
140. Id.; See Landmark Med. Ctr. v. Gauthier, 635 A.2d 1145, 1148-49 (R.I.
1994) (holding that an implied-in-law contract is formed when medically necessary
services are rendered even without mutual assent).
141. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 73, § 1.12, at 19–20 (discussing
express, implied, and quasi contracts).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See infra notes 225–250 and accompanying text.
145. See Bingham Mem’l Hosp. v. Boyd 8 P.3d 664, 668 (Idaho Ct. App.
2000).
In order to establish a prima facie case for an’ implied in law contract, the
plaintiff must show that there was (1) a benefit conferred upon the defen-
dant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefits;
and (3) acceptance of the benefits under circumstances that would make
it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to
the plaintiff of the value thereof.
Id. at 668 (citation omitted); Van Zanen v. Qwest Wireless, LLC 522 F.3d 1127,
1130 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[T]o establish a claim of unjust enrichment a plaintiff must
show that (1) at plaintiff’s expense (2) defendant received a benefit (3) under cir-
cumstances that would make it unjust for defendant to retain the benefit without
paying.”).
146. See supra note 150.
147. See supra note 150.
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party for the benefit received.148  The amount that the benefitted
party must pay is the fair value of the benefit received.149
If there is an actual contract between the parties, the doctrine
of quasi contract cannot be applied.150  In addition, the law usually
does not look favorably on one party foisting their goods or services
upon another.151  For example, if I were stopped at a red traffic
light and someone came out and cleaned my windshield without my
consent or request, the doctrine of quasi contract could not be used
to require payment for the service.152
However, there is a well-settled exception for emergency medi-
cal care.153  That is, if a doctor happens upon an injured party and
provides medical care, the doctor may recover under quasi contract
148. See supra note 150.
149. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 79, §1.12 (noting that if a physi-
cian gives a child necessary medical care in the face of parental neglect, the physi-
cian may recover from the parents, in quasi contract, the value of his services)
(note omitted).
150. See, e.g., Boyd, 8 P.3d at 668 (“Where an express contract exists, an im-
plied contract between the same parties for the same contractual purpose is pre-
cluded from enforcement.”); Indus. Lift Truck Serv. Corp. v. Mitsubishi Int’l Corp.
432 N.E.2d 999, 1002 (Ill. Ct. App. 1982) (“The general rule is that no quasi-con-
tractual claim can arise when a contract exists between the parties concerning the
same subject matter on which the quasi-contractual claim rests.”).
151. See, e.g., Boyd, 8 P.3d at 668 (“The services must be rendered under such
circumstances as to indicate the person rendering an expected to be paid, and that
the recipient expected, or should have expected to pay for them.”).
152. See id.  Cf. Unordered Merchandise, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://bit.ly/
2eQuaDn [https://perma.cc/ST2J-4LY4] (last visited July 11, 2019) (“If you receive
merchandise that you didn’t order, you have a legal right to keep it as a free gift.”).
153. See, e.g., Boyd, 8 P.3d at 669 (citing In re Estate of Crisan, 107 N.W.2d
907 (Mich. 1961)); Landmark Med. Ctr. v. Gauthier, 635 A.2d 1145, 1148–49 (R.I.
1994). See also FREDERIC CAMPBELL WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI CON-
TRACTS § 201 (1913), https://bit.ly/2xAhAC4 [https://perma.cc/4UUA-RY37].
It seems to be taken for granted that at the common law there is no legal
obligation, independent of contract, to pay for non-professional services
rendered, in an emergency, in the preservation of life.  The intervention
may be dutiful; the conduct of the intervener may be heroic.  But . . .
there is an irrefutable presumption, based either upon considerations of
policy or upon knowledge of normal human conduct, that the service is
intended to be gratuitous.
The considerations which underlie the irrefutable presumption just re-
ferred to have no application in the case of professional services—as of a
physician or nurse.  For while such services are usually prompted, in
greater or less measure, by motives of humanity, they are generally ren-
dered with the expectation of compensation.  Moreover, in the case of a
physician or nurse, there is nothing unworthy in such an exception.  It
follows that for professional services, unless there is evidence either that
credit was extended to the third[-]party or that there was no intention to
charge, the beneficiary should be required to pay reasonable value.
Id.
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for his or her services even if the patient was unconscious during
the treatment.154  In other words, the law takes the position that an
injured party would have consented to emergency medical care had
the party been able to consent to the care offered.155  As a result,
both public policy and fairness require that the doctor receive rea-
sonable compensation for the services provided.156  A doctor pro-
viding emergency services will be able to recover the fair or
reasonable market value of the medical care provided.157
C. Types of Contracts: Express and Implied-In-Fact Contracts
As noted, express contracts are based upon the words, either
oral or written, that the parties have exchanged.158  In a hospital
admission contract, these words are written; therefore, the hospital
attempts to enforce an express contract with the patient.159  Estab-
lishing an express contract requires mutual assent between the par-
ties.160  As discussed above, in an emergency admission situation
like that involving Mr. Dennis, there is usually no real mutual as-
sent.161  As a result, courts should either reject the written contract
notwithstanding the fact that the patient signed it (in which case the
hospital would have the right to recover the fair market value of its
services under a quasi contract theory),162 or closely scrutinize the
written contract to identify and prevent enforcement of any unex-
154. See Landmark Med. Ctr., 635 A.2d at 1148–49 (stating that because an
implied-in-law contract is formed when medically necessary services are rendered
even without mutual assent, the recipient of such services is liable to the service
provider).
155. See, e.g., In re Estate of Crisan, 107 N.W.2d at 914 (“[Implied-in-law con-
tracts are formed so] that a person needing help in an emergency and not able to
ask for it should obtain it[;] the attainment of such a result [is] aided by assuring
compensation to the person rendering aid . . .”) (citing to RESTATEMENT (FIRST)
OF RESTITUTION: PRESERVATION OF ANOTHER’S LIFE OR HEATH § 116 (AM. LAW
INST. 1937)).
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Boyd, 8 P.3d at 669 (“The measure of damages in a claim for
unjust enrichment is the value of the benefits bestowed upon the defendant which,
in equity, will be unjust for him or her pain without compensating the plaintiff.”).
It is important to note that in in Boyd, the court awarded the Hospital an amount
equal to the principal cost of rendering services, but the court noted specifically
that this was due to the fact that the amount of the charge was not challenged,
rather only liability on the account was challenged. Id.
158. See supra note 141.
159. Id.
160. See supra notes 79–140 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 79–140 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 79–140 and accompanying text.
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pected, unusual, unfair, or oppressive terms such as a payment
formula tied to the hospital’s CDM rates.163
In non-emergency admissions, including voluntary inpatient
and outpatient admissions, patients are often capable of giving real
assent.  However, for the reasons discussed below, this rarely occurs
with respect to price.164  In the non-emergency context, hospital ad-
mission agreements are still contracts of adhesion; they are written
solely by the hospital, the dominant party that possesses much more
bargaining power and knowledge regarding the contract and its
meaning than the patient.  Even if a patient understood the price
formula, which is very unlikely, the patient has no meaningful abil-
ity to negotiate with the hospital.165  Finally, the price terms in-
cluded in these contracts (e.g. the patient is obligated to pay the
hospital in accordance with the hospital’s “regular rates,”
“charges,” “billed charges,” or “charge description master”), as dis-
cussed in more detail below, are indefinite, confusing, and mislead-
ing to patients; most importantly, they provide for a price that is
grossly excessive.166  As a result, when courts scrutinize these con-
tracts looking for unexpected, unusual, unfair, or oppressive terms,
they should pay particular attention to the price term.167  In the al-
ternative, a court may decide that no contract has been entered into
based on the written agreement, because true mutual assent to the
writing is lacking due to its adhesive nature; its indefinite, confus-
ing, and unfair terms; or both.168
If a court decides, in the non-emergency context, that no con-
tract exists based on the written admission agreement, then in all
likelihood the court will find that an implied-in-fact contract exists
based on the actions of the hospital and the patient.169  That is,
medical care is provided by the hospital and accepted by the pa-
163. See supra notes 79–140 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 79–140 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 79–140 and accompanying text.
166. See infra notes 204–24 and accompanying text.
167. Recall that the patient’s agreement to pay the hospital’s charges is really
an agreement to pay an exorbitant amount, on average more than three times the
price the hospital has agreed to accept in full payment from the majority of its
patients.  See supra notes 1–26 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 204–24 and accompanying text.
169. See Portercare Adventist Health Sys. v. Lego, 312 P.3d 201, 203 (Colo.
App. 2010), rev’d on other grounds, 286 P.3d 525 (Colo. 2012).  This case involved
a breach of an implied-in-fact contract to pay a hospital for medical services pro-
vided to a patient.  The implied-in-fact contract was established by the actions of
the patient and her husband.  The hospital specifically stated “(1) Ms. Lego’s deci-
sion to remain at the hospital after her insurance coverage ceased, knowing that
the hospital would charge her for services provided after October 1, and (2) the
hospital’s provision of services after that date—created a contract implied in fact.”
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tient; the hospital reasonably expects payment; and the patient rea-
sonably expects to pay for the care received.170  As a result, the
court is likely to recognize that the parties have entered into a con-
tract based on their actions even though there was no mutual assent
to the written admission agreement.171
If the court recognizes that an implied-in-fact contract exists,
then the court must provide the price that the patient is required to
pay because there would have been no express agreement on a
price formula.172  The court will likely decide that the price that
should be provided is that upon which a prudent buyer and seller
would agree if they had the time and knowledge to properly negoti-
ate:  the fair market value of the medical care received.173  As dis-
cussed below, the court can easily and readily determine the
reasonable market value of medical care by consulting the average
amount the hospital has agreed to accept as full payment from in-
network private health insurers.174
In summary, courts should recognize that providers of emer-
gency health care have a right to recover fair market value under
the doctrine of quasi contract.175  For non-emergency care where
the patient has signed an admission agreement, the court must de-
termine whether to enforce the agreement or reject it as lacking
real mutual assent.176  Courts deciding to enforce the admission
agreement in this context should recognize that it is a contract of
adhesion and scrutinize it for any unusual, unexpected, oppressive,
or unfair terms, such as price terms that require the patient to pay
exorbitant CDM-based list prices.177  These terms should be struck
from the contract and—for CDM-based price formulas—replaced
with a reasonable price equal to the fair market value of the health-
care services received by the patient.178  Courts refusing to enforce
the admissions agreement after medical care has been provided and
Id. at 203. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 73, §1.12 at 19–20 (2d ed. 1977)
(discussing implied-in-fact contracts).
170. Lego, 312 P.3d at 206.  (“Several courts have found the contract implied[-
]in[-]fact where a patient accepts medical services understanding that those ser-
vices must be paid for by the patient, and have held that the measure of recovery is




174. See infra notes 250–314 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 79–140 and accompanying text.  In addition, it is very
important to note that CDM-based prices are not a reflection of reasonable value.
176. See supra notes 79–140 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 79–140 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 141–63 and accompanying text.
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accepted will likely find that an implied-fact-contract exists and will
find, as in the quasi contract situation, that the patient owes the fair
market value of the health care provided.179
This article focuses next on price terms in hospital admissions
contracts and specifically on how they should be interpreted.180  As
discussed below, it is argued here that the patient has agreed to pay
only the market-based fair value of the care received.181  Market-
based fair value is the amount that the hospital actually receives in
payment from the majority of its patients for the same care that has
been provided to the patient in question.182  A hospital’s argument
that, under the terms of the admissions agreement, a patient has
agreed to a CDM-based price formula that requires the patient to
pay the hospital’s list price—which, as noted, is on average three
and a half times the market value—should be rejected.183
II. THE PRICE FORMULA IN PATIENT/HOSPITAL CONTRACTS
(INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS, MISSING PRICE TERM
CONTRACTS, AND ILLUSORY CONTRACTS)
A. Missing Price Term Versus Price Formula
When a court decides to enforce the admission agreement, one
issue that arises is whether the agreement is missing a price term.184
This is important because if the court finds that a contract based on
the admission agreement exists, but also finds that the parties have
not agreed on a clear, definite, and fixed price, then the court must
provide the price.  Courts typically do so by determining a reasona-
ble price based on the market value of the goods or services in
179. See supra notes 141–63 and accompanying text.
180. See infra notes 190–224 and accompanying text
181. See infra notes 225–249 and accompanying text.
182. See infra notes 278–294 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 1–26 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Allen v. Clarion Health Partners, Inc., 980 N.E.2d 306, 309 (Ind.
2012).  The admissions agreement stated: “In consideration of services delivered by
Clarian North Medical Center and/or the physicians, the undersigned guarantees
payment of the account, and agrees to pay the same upon discharge if such account
is not paid by a private or governmental insurance carrier . . . If the amounts due
[to] Clarian North Medical Center for services rendered become delinquent and
the debt is referred to an attorney for collection, it is understood and agreed that I
shall be responsible for reasonable attorneys’ fees, court costs, and pre-judgment
interest.” Id. Patients argued that the chargemaster rates imposed by Clarian
were unreasonable and constituted a breach of contract. Id. at 308–309.  The
Court noted that the breach of contract claim depended on a critical underlying
premise, namely, that the contract lacked the material term of price, and because
no price term was present the court needed to impute a “reasonable price” to the
contract. Id. at 309. However, the court noted that a contract need not declare a
specific dollar amount for goods or services in order to be enforceable.  Id. at 310.
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question.185  As a result, if a court finds that the admission agree-
ment does not contain a reasonably definite, certain, and fixed
price, then the patient will be obligated to pay far less than the pro-
vider’s exorbitant CDM-based list price.186
Hospital admissions agreements refer to price in a variety of
ways.  In the case of Mr. Dennis, the financial responsibility agree-
ment stated, “[T]he patient is obligated to pay the hospital in accor-
dance with the hospital’s charge description master.”187  Other
common price term formulations contained in admissions agree-
ments refer to the patient’s obligation to pay the hospital its “regu-
lar rates,” “list charges,” “billed charges,” “list prices,” or “all
amounts billed by the provider.”188  What all of these various for-
mulations have in common is that they do not state a specific dol-
lars-and-cents price and they all, regardless of whether they
specifically mention the CDM, purport to require the patient to pay
the hospital’s CDM-based list price for the medical care received.189
The law does not require that the parties always agree to a
dollars-and-cents price. The parties may agree to a price formula.190
185. See, e.g., Ind. Bell Tel. Co. v. Ice Serv. Inc., 231 N.E. 2d 820, 824 (1967)
(“Where there is an agreement that compensation is to be paid but the price is not
fixed, the party furnishing services and materials in performance of the contract is
entitled to the reasonable value thereof.”).
186. See, e.g., Doe v. HCA Health Servs. of Tenn., 46 S.W.3d 191, 199 (Tenn.
2001) (holding that a patient’s agreement to be “financially responsible to the hos-
pital for charges not covered by” insurance was indefinite and hospital was entitled
to the reasonable value of the medical goods and services it provided to patient).
Id.
187. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., Allen, 980 N.E.2d at 308 (noting that the contract guaranteed
payment on the account); Doe, 46 S.W.3d at 197 (finding that the agreement re-
quired the patient to be “financially responsible to the hospital for charges not
covered by” insurance); Phx. Baptist Hosp. & Medical Ctr. v. Aiken, 877 P.2d
1345, 1347 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that the patient was obligated to pay the
account of the hospital in accordance with the regular rates and terms of the hospi-
tal); St. John’s Episcopal Hosp. v. McAdoo, 405 N.Y.S.2d 935, 935 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1978) (finding that a contract obligated a patient to pay for charges not covered by
insurance).
189. See Doe, 46 S.W.3d at 194 (The hospital demanded its chargemaster-
based prices.); see also Allen, 980 N.E.2d at 310 (The hospital used chargemaster-
based price to negotiate with insurance companies.).
190. See, e.g., Allen, 980 N.E.2d at 310. (A contract need not declare a specific
a dollar amount for goods or services in order to be enforceable.). However, the
formula agreed to must be reasonably definite and certain. See, e.g., Doe, 46
S.W.3d at 197 (holding that an admission agreement that referred to the patients
“being financially responsible to the hospital for charges not covered by insurance”
was not clear that it intended the hospital’s CDM to be used as the formula to set
the price and therefore finding the contract contained no price term). Id. at 197.
Moreover, the formula used must be set at the time of the contract and not be
illusory. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 73 at § 2.13 (discussing indefinite-
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The agreed-upon formula can be used subsequently to determine
the dollars-and-cents price.191  For example, in a requirements con-
tract, the buyer may agree to pay $3.00 per gallon for all heating oil
requested and delivered during a particular heating season.192  The
actual dollars-and-cents amount that the customer will owe at the
end of the season for heating oil under the contract is not stated,
but once the customer requests and receives a delivery, the amount
owed can be determined by applying the formula contained in the
contract ($3.00 multiplied by the number of gallons requested and
delivered).
As noted, hospital admission agreements virtually never con-
tain an actual dollars-and-cents price.193  A possible legitimate rea-
son for this in the emergency admission context is that at the time
of admission neither the hospital nor the patient knows with cer-
tainty the exact type and quantity of healthcare that will be needed
by the patient.194 The question for the court is whether the admis-
ness as it relates to mutual assent).  To do so, they provided the following
illustration:
B promised to work as a foreman of a plant for one year in exchange for
a fair share of the profits, and the promise was held to be too vague and
indefinite to be enforced, but if B performs under the agreement he may
obtain a quasi-contractual recovery measured by the reasonable value of
his services.
Id.  As discussed below, CDMs change frequently and many hospitals keep no
record, at least records ascertainable by patients as to the history of the prices
contained in the CDM. See infra notes 203–04 and accompanying text.
191. See infra notes 198–199 and accompanying text.
192. See Note, Requirements Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
102 U. PA. L. REV. 654, 654–655 (1954) (“More recent authority, however, recog-
nizes that in the bargained-for exchange of promises each party has limited his
freedom to some extent and that the terms “requirements” or “needs” supply a
sufficiently objective standard to be enforceable.  Thus, today, the typical require-
ments contract is generally held valid.”).
193. As noted, an exception would be non-medically necessary cosmetic pro-
cedures such as certain non-medically necessary face-lift, hair-plugs, breast aug-
mentation, or liposuction.
194. See, e.g., DiCarlo v. St. Mary Hosp., 2006 WL 2038498, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 49000 at *11 (D.N.J. 2006) (discussing admissions to the emergency depart-
ment) the court stated,
[T]he price term ‘all charges’ is certainly less precise than price term of
the ordinary contract for goods or services in that it does not specify the
exact amount to be paid.  It is, however, the only practical way in which
the obligations of the patient to pay can be set forth, given the fact that
nobody yet knows just what condition the patient has, and what treat-
ments will be necessary to remedy what ails him or her.
Id. It must be noted, however, that in the non-emergency admissions context, it is
likely very possible for hospitals to give a precise and accurate price quote for the
medical care the patient is scheduled to receive.  For example, the hospital agrees
in advance with its in-network insurers the price it will accept for the medical pro-
cedures it provides.  Further, for non-medically necessary procedures that are not
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sion agreement, notwithstanding the fact that it does not contain a
dollars-and-cents price, contains a price formula that is both fixed,
reasonably definite, and certain enough to be used to determine the
price.195  If it does not, then the contract is missing an enforceable
price term.196  Given the adhesive nature of admission agreements,
even if the court finds a price formula sufficiently fixed and clear
and definite, the court still needs to look closely at the resulting
price to ensure its fairness.197  These issues are discussed next.
B. CDM-Based Prices Are Illusory, Unknown, and Unknowable
As discussed above, at least in the context of emergency admis-
sions, neither the patient nor the hospital knows at the time of con-
tracting the exact amount of medical care the patient will require.198
As a result, a price formula, rather than a dollars-and-cents price, is
needed in the admission agreement used for emergency patients.199
Like in a requirements contract, the hospital is agreeing to provide
all of the medical care the patient requires, but the exact amount
and nature of the care required is unknown at the time of
contracting.200
This article argues that a CDM-based price formula is very un-
likely to be enforceable in an admission agreement.  This is true for
covered by insurance, for example, non-medically necessary plastic surgery, an ex-
act price is commonly set in advance.  It seems possible, perhaps even likely, that
hospitals could provide such a price quote but choose not to in order to preserve
their pricing flexibility and maximize their revenue.
195. See, e.g., Doe, 46 S.W.3d at 190 (holding that a patient’s agreement to be
“financially responsible to the hospital for charges not covered by” insurance was
indefinite and hospital was entitled to the reasonable value of the medical goods
and services it provided to patient).  But see Allen, 980 N.E.2d at 310 (holding that
the promise to pay the account for treatment is, while imprecise, not sufficiently
indefinite to justify imposition of a reasonable price standard and noting further
that in the context of a contract for the provision of and payment for medical
services, a hospital’s chargemaster rates serve as the basis for its pricing).
196. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 73, § 2.13 (2nd ed. 1977) (discuss-
ing indefiniteness as it relates to mutual assent).  They provided the following
illustration:
[I]f A and B agree that A will perform a service for B and no mention is
made of price, it will be implied that the parties intended that a reasona-
ble price should be paid and received.  The same is true if goods are in-
volved.  It will be assumed that the parties contracted in terms of a
reasonable price which will ordinarily be the market price.
Id.
197. As noted above, it is very unlikely that any price resulting from the appli-
cation of CDM-based prices would be fair, in fact, such prices are likely to be
unconscionable.
198. See supra notes 31 and 32 and accompanying text.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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several reasons.  First, especially in the emergency context, it is
likely that no mutual assent exists with respect to the admission
agreement.  Because there is no contract between the hospital and
patient, the hospital’s recovery will be based on quasi contract.201
Second, many of the references in admission agreements are too
indefinite to be enforceable.  For example, when an admission
agreement requires a patient to pay “the account of the hospital,”
“regular rates,” “all charges,” “billed charges,” or words of similar
import, it may not contain a clear and definite reference to the hos-
pital’s CDM-based price formula.202  Third, even when the admis-
sion agreement clearly provides for a price based on the hospital’s
CDM, it is likely that the CDM is illusory:  too indefinite to be used
as a price formula.203  This is because the CDM is completely under
the control of the hospital; the hospital may unilaterally change its
prices at any time.204  Thus, at the time of contracting, the CDM
prices are not fixed but in flux.  Finally, even if the court finds that
the parties gave mutual assent to an admission agreement; finds
that the agreement contains a clear and definite price formula tied
to the hospital’s CDM; determines that the CDM published at the
time the patient signed the admission agreement is the one that is
referenced in the formula (so that the CDM-based prices were fixed
on that date); and further finds somehow that the CDM’s gibberish
of codes and numbers is meaningful to a patient,205 even then the
201. See supra notes 79–140 and accompanying text discussing the proper ap-
plication of objective intent.
202. See, e.g., Doe, 46 S.W.3d at 195.
203. See, e.g., Cape Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Sanchez, No. CPM DC 109-11, at *9
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Mar. 26, 2012) (noting that most patients, upon entering
hospital, sign “Authorization for Treatment,” “Statement of Financial Responsibil-
ity,” or another similarly open-ended agreement pursuant to which patient pur-
ports to agree to pay for all medical goods and services provided by hospital at
hospital’s list (chargemaster) prices; in reality, however, this type of agreement
amounts to blank check given by patients to hospitals with amounts to be unilater-
ally filled in by hospitals later).
204. Id.  This problem has been ameliorated somewhat, at least in theory, by
the recent requirement (as of January 1, 2019) that hospitals publish their CDMs.
However, in practice these published CDMs provide very little useful information
to patients and certainly do not allow patients to have any awareness of the price
that they will be charged.  Moreover, the issues related to price changes and keep-
ing records of previous prices to determine the prices that apply to a particular
patient (is it the prices in effect when the patient signs the admission agreement,
those in effect when the goods and services are provided to the patient, or those in
effect when the final bill is calculated; and once any of the 30 or 40 thousand prices
contained in the CDM changes, how is the patient to access the old prices to be
sure the charges were accurately calculated?) have not been addressed by the new
requirement that hospitals publish their CDMs.
205. See Robert Pear, Hospitals Must Now Post Prices. But It May Take a
Brain Surgeon to Decipher Them, (N.Y. TIMES) (Jan. 13, 2019) https://nyti.ms/
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biggest problem with CDM-based prices remains:  the price arrived
at by application of the formula is likely to be so grossly excessive
and unfair to patients as to be unconscionable.206  Because the ad-
mission agreement is an adhesion contract,207 the unconscionable
price term will not be enforced.208
As noted, price formulas tied to CDM-based prices are not
fixed at the time of contracting.  This presents a potentially fatal
problem from the perspective of contract law.  Unlike the require-
ments contract example above, a hospital using a CDM-based price
formula is not agreeing to a price formula that is either fixed209 or
discernable by the patient.210  As a result, courts may decide that
CDM-based price formulas are illusory and therefore
unenforceable.
CDM-based prices remain solely under the control of the hos-
pital.  Hospitals can change the prices contained in their CDMs at
any time, and they frequently do.211  Moreover, there is no require-
2QN0CHx, [https://perma.cc/85PQ-KPNB] (“‘This is gibberish, totally meaning-
less, a foreign language to me,’ said Sara Stovall, 41, of Charlottesville, Va., after
looking at price lists for hospitals in her area.”)
206. See supra notes 1–26 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 79–140 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 79–140 and accompanying text.
209. As noted, hospitals may change these prices at any time, and the admis-
sion agreement does not state the date on which prices contained in the CDM will
be fixed.  One could argue that the published CDM, assuming there is only one, on
the date the admission agreement was signed contains the prices that must be used
to determine the price under that admission agreement.  However, if prices are
subsequently changed in the CDM, which is essentially assured, and this were to
occur prior to the goods and services being used for the patient, then one could
argue that those more recent prices should be used in calculating the price due
under the admission agreement.  Finally, a case could be made for using the CDM
published at time the patient’s bill is calculated.  (I would guess that this is the
method actually used by most hospitals.)  The very fact that there are a variety of
options possible is what destroys the certainty required to make a price formula
based on CDM prices enforceable.
210. The recent federal requirement that hospitals publish their CDMs online
does not change the fact that CDM-based prices are still not determinable by pa-
tients.  CDMs contain 30,000 to 40,000 individual line items.  They do not contain
procedure-based prices.  For a patient to use the published CDM to calculate the
price the they would owe, the patient would have to have medical expertise and be
fluent in medical coding.  For example, the patient would have to know how much
emergency room time would be necessary, how much suture material would be
used, etc., and would need to know the billing code for each item.  Of course, if all
of this were knowable, then the hospital could calculate the bill and simply insert
the dollars-and-cents price into the admission agreement!  No patient can success-
fully use the CDM to calculate the price he or she will owe.
211. Nation, Chargemaster, supra note 2 at 746–747
Each hospital maintains its own unique chargemaster, which it updates
annually or more frequently as it sees fit, and extreme variation in list
prices among hospitals, even those in the same geographic area, is com-
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ment that a hospital keep a record of prices previously contained in
the CDM.  Nor is it clear what date hospitals will use to determine
the CDM to apply when billing the patient.212  That is, which CDM
rates will be used to calculate the amount the patient owes?  The
CDM rates that were in effect at the time the patient was admitted
to the hospital?  Those in effect when the patient received treat-
ment?  Those in effect when the patient was released from the hos-
pital?  Or those in effect when the patient’s bill was finally
calculated and sent (a process that can take months)?213  Thus, the
amount a patient owes can vary significantly depending on which
CDM prices a hospital chooses.  The result is that the hospital is not
limited in any way by this formula; it may charge the patient virtu-
ally any amount it wishes!214
As noted, a hospital may change its CDM at any time.  In most
cases, the patient has no way of determining what the CDM prices
were at the time of contracting.  This is vastly different from a re-
quirements contract requiring a buyer to pay $3.00 per gallon for
heating oil.215  The key to that contract’s enforceability is that the
$3.00 price is fixed at the time of contracting, even though the quan-
tity is not.216  As a result, the buyer knows exactly how much
money they will owe based on the contract rate and the amount of
oil they request.217  In contrast, when patients agree to pay a hospi-
tal’s CDM-based list prices, they are essentially agreeing to allow
the hospital to charge any amounts that the hospital wishes—with-
out limitation—at the time it bills the patients.218  As a result,
courts should find CDM-based price terms unenforceable:  there is
no free and knowing assent to them; they are illusory; and the
prices they set are unconscionably excessive.  Enforcement of
CDM-based price formulas is shockingly unfair to patients.
mon.  The list prices contained in the chargemaster are truly arbitrary and
capricious from the point of view of pricing except in one respect – the
higher the list price, the higher the hospital’s revenue. (notes omitted).
Id.
212. See supra notes 198 – 208 and accompanying text.
213. The fact that there are a variety of options, each of which may have a
valid claim to being the proper one to use, is what destroys the certainty necessary
to making a price formula based on a CDM enforceable. See supra note 209.
214. See supra note 209.
215. See supra notes 192 –197 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 192 – 197 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 192 – 197 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 214.
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III. CONTRACTING FOR HEALTH CARE
A. Emergency Department Admissions and Implied-in-Fact or
Quasi Contracts
When patients enter the hospital through the emergency de-
partment, most patients are not able to assent to the written admis-
sion agreement even if they are able to sign it, for the reasons
discussed above.219  Whether the court finds an implied-in-fact con-
tract or a quasi contract depends on the facts and circumstances of
the specific case.  All patients in the emergency department are ex-
periencing extreme and distressing circumstances, but their levels of
cognitive ability may vary.  For example, a patient who arrives un-
conscious has no ability to assent.  In this case, the only option is a
quasi contract, pursuant to which, as discussed above, the patient is
required to pay the hospital the reasonable market value of the
medical care received.220  This is true notwithstanding the fact that
many hospitals in this situation will require the family member or
Good Samaritan who brought the patient to the hospital to sign the
admission agreement.221  The signature of anyone other than the
patient, with the exception of an authorized agent of the patient
(and very few patients arrive at the emergency department with an
219. See supra notes 119 – 121 and accompanying text.
220. Cf. Phx. Baptist Hosp. & Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Aiken, 877 P.2d 1345, 1347
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (denying the hospital’s request for summary judgment and
concluding there was a material issue of fact concerning the conscionability of the
procedure used to obtain the agreement where a patient was unable to sign the
admissions agreement so patient’s husband signed the admission agreement, which
provided, “[T]he undersigned agrees (whether signing as agent, representative, or
as patient, and whether or not insured or a member of the health maintenance
organization) that, in consideration of the services to be rendered to the patient, he
or she is hereby individually obligated to pay the account of the hospital in accor-
dance with the regular rates and terms of the hospital. . .” and the hospital claimed
that husband was liable from his personal assets to pay for the hospital care pro-
vided to the patient); St. John’s Episcopal Hosp. v. McAdoo, 405 N.Y.S.2d 935, 937
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1978) (finding similarly, noting the trauma and anxiety experienced
by those confronted with an emergency medical crisis and concluding that the hos-
pital emergency room is certainly not a place where a reasonable person could be
expected exercise “calm and dispassionate judgment” and that a reasonable person
would give a hospital admission contract at most “cursory attention.”).  The court
in St. John’s Episcopal Hosp. concluded that a hospital should not be permitted to
enforce a contractual obligation entered into under such tension-laden circum-
stances. Id.
221. See supra note 226.
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agent authorized to enter into contracts on their behalf),222 cannot
bind the patient to the contract.223
Other patients may arrive at the emergency department legally
capable of entering into an implied-in-fact contract.224  However,
few, if any, patients arrive at the emergency department capable of
reading and negotiating an express contract due to the stressful and
tension-laden circumstances surrounding admission through the
emergency department.  As discussed above, these circumstances
prevent the patient from giving free and knowing assent to the ad-
mission agreement they are forced to sign.225  However, depending
on the exact circumstances, a court may find that some of these
patients are sufficiently conscious that they are entering the hospi-
tal and that the hospital expects payment, such that a patient’s co-
222. See Nation, Accident supra note 6 at 647–650 (discussing the circum-
stances surrounding a patient’s signing of an admission agreement and some of the
terms commonly included in such agreements and noting that:
Another sleazy provision says if the patient is physically unable to sign
the agreement, then the Good Samaritan who brought the patient to the
ED must sign as a “duly authorized agent” of the patient. Does this make
any sense?  Very few people as a normal course happen to have duly
authorized agents.  Moreover, it seems very unlikely that after the occur-
rence of the emergency precipitating the trip to the ED, the patient
would have the capacity to duly authorize an agent any more than the
patient would have the capacity to freely and knowingly accept the Ad-
missions Agreement.
Id. at 648–49 (notes omitted).
223. It is important to note that entering into a contract is different than pro-
viding informed consent to receive medical treatment, which hospitals are required
to get and which may be, in certain cases, provided by appropriate family mem-
bers. See Raphael J. Leo, M.D., Competency and the Capacity to Make Treatment
Decisions: A Primer for Primary Care Physicians, PRIM. CARE COMPANION J.
CLIN. PSYCHIATRY 1999;1(5), 131(“To ensure that individuals retain as much au-
tonomy or self-determination as is legally possible, the court makes a determina-
tion of one’s competence in a task-specific manner. For example, one can be
determined to be incompetent to execute a will, but may be deemed competent to
make treatment decisions.”). See also When is Informed Consent Needed?, AMERI-
CAN CANCER SOCIETY, https://bit.ly/2xJQpVj [https://perma.cc/XYU4-8JSX] (last
visited July 19, 2019) (“Many states have passed family agency acts that choose
which family members [(in a listed order of priority] may act on behalf of a person
who cannot speak for her- or himself.  This option may be used if you don’t have
an advance directive or court-appointed proxy.  Depending on your family situa-
tion and which state you are in, that person may be your legal guardian, spouse,
parent, child, sibling, or other relative.”); Informed Consent, AMA, https://bit.ly/
2XGIMhR [https://perma.cc/JW33-KG5A] (last visited July 19, 2019)
(“In emergencies, when a decision must be made urgently, the patient is not able
to participate in decision making, and the patient’s surrogate is not available, phy-
sicians may initiate treatment without prior informed consent.”).
224. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 73, § 8.10 at 250–51 (discussing
the test for contractual capacity as whether the party understands the nature and
consequences of his act time of the transaction).
225. See supra notes 121 – 124 and accompanying text.
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operation with and acceptance of the medical care provided can
reasonably be interpreted as accepting an obligation to pay (a fair
and reasonable amount) for the care received.226
If a court finds that an implied-in-fact contract exists based on
the actions of the parties, the court must provide the price for the
parties because there has been no agreement between the parties
on a specific price.227  As a result, a patient in this circumstance,
like the unconscious patient entering the emergency department,
would be legally responsible to pay the reasonable market value of
the medical care received, though in this case the obligation will be
pursuant to an implied-in-fact contract rather than a quasi-
contract.228
Finally, an argument can be made that there is no considera-
tion (another essential requirement to create a contract)229 to sup-
port a patient’s promise to pay for the care received in an
emergency admission.  This argument is based on the fact that,
under the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act statute (EMTALA requires any emergency room to evaluate,
stabilize, and treat any patient that presents there regardless of the
patient’s ability to pay),230 hospitals have a pre-existing duty to pro-
226. See, e.g., Portercare Adventist Health Sys. v. Lego, 312 p.3d 201, 206
(Colo. App. 2010), rev’d on other grounds, 286 P.3d 525 (Colo. 2012). The court
noted that “several courts have found a contract implied in fact where a patient
accepts medical services understanding that those services must be paid for by the
patient, and have held that the measure of recovery is the reasonable value of
those services.” Id.  In other words, the patient may be able to understand in a
broad way that he is agreeing to pay, a reasonable amount to the hospital for the
care he will receive.
227. See supra notes 164 – 189 and accompanying text.  See also, CALAMARI
& PERILLO, supra note 73, §8.15 at 255 (discussing the exploitation of individuals
that have a compromised capacity to enter into a contract and noting cases of this
nature are often not decided on grounds of lack of capacity, but on the basis of the
person’s limited mental ability coupled with unconscionable exploitation by the
other party).  For example, a hard bargain aggressively pressed upon a sober alco-
holic by a party who knows of his consuming desire for cash to obtain liquor has
been found voidable for overreaching.  As another example, the authors note re-
leases extracted from injured persons at a time in their suffering great shock or
pain. Finally, the authors note that: “Some degree of infirmity [compromised ca-
pacity to contract] coupled with the unfairness of the bargain will often result in a
finding a fraud, undue influence, overreaching or even mental incapacity.  The re-
cent enlargement of the doctrine of unconscionability offers another and perhaps
more forthright approach two cases of this kind.” Id.  It is not difficult to draw a
close analogy between Mr. Dennis and his overwhelming desire to be treated for
his perceived heart attack and the alcoholic’s desire for cash to obtain liquor in the
above example.
228. See supra Section III.B.
229. See supra notes 77 – 84 and accompanying text.
230. Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd (1986).
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vide a certain amount of care (stabilizing treatment) to all patients
who enter the emergency room.  As a result of this pre-existing
duty, the hospital does not suffering a legal detriment in exchange
for a patient’s promise to pay.  That is, the hospital is not doing
something (providing treatment) that it was not already legally obli-
gated do (pursuant to the statute) in exchange for the patient’s
promise to pay.  This argument may prevent formation of a contract
based on either the express promise made in the admission agree-
ment, if for some reason the court found that the written agreement
was otherwise enforceable, or the implied-in-fact promise to pay
based on the actions of the parties.  However, it would not prevent
recognition of a quasi contract, because a quasi contract is not a
real contract.231
Thus, all patients who arrive at the hospital through the emer-
gency department should be required to pay no more than the rea-
sonable market value for the medical care they receive.  They
should not be required to pay the exorbitant CDM-based price, re-
gardless of whether they have signed an admission agreement con-
taining a CDM-based price formula.
B. Non-Emergency Department Admissions, Contracts of
Adhesion, and Unconscionable Prices
The legal situation of patients who arrive at the hospital other
than through the emergency department is different.  Some of these
patients may have the time and presence of mind to read, under-
stand, and—theoretically, at least—negotiate an admission agree-
ment with the hospital.232  The problem that many of these patients
face is that they are presented with an adhesive contract that is con-
fusing and provides for a grossly unfair price.233  That is, even if the
circumstances allow the patient a meaningful opportunity to read
the admission agreement, the patient will still have no ability to ne-
gotiate its terms or to understand the meaning of the ambiguous
price term that it contains.234  As noted above, the CDM-based
231. See supra Part II.B.
232. See supra note 199 (discussing patients receiving non-medically necessary
treatment).
233. See supra notes 204–224 and accompanying text (discussing that most
hospitals use the same standard admission agreement for both emergency and non-
emergency admissions).
234. Also, seeking treatment at another hospital is not a viable alternative for
patients because they feel constrained to go to the hospital where their doctor is on
staff. See, e.g., Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App.3d 345, 366 (1976) (“A
patient like Mr. Wheeler realistically has no choice but to seek admission to the
hospital to which he has been directed by his physician and to sign the printed
forms necessary to gain admission.”).
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price formula contained in admission agreements is illusory, and pa-
tients cannot possibly use it to determine how much they will owe
the hospital (even if patients have access to CDMs).235  Moreover,
admission agreements typically contain price formulas based on
CDM prices; these prices are grossly excessive and shockingly
unfair.236
As a result, if a court finds that an admission agreement signed
by either an emergency or non-emergency patient is enforceable,
then (due to the admission agreement’s adhesive nature) the court
should scrutinize it closely and refuse to enforce any price formula
tied to CDM-based prices.237  As a result, the patient should be ob-
ligated to pay no more than the reasonable market value of the
healthcare received.238  There are a number of reasons a court may
refuse to enforce a CDM-based price formula even if the admission
agreement in which it is contained is otherwise enforceable (that is,
the court finds that under the circumstances the patient had the ca-
pacity to assent to the admission agreement and did in fact assent to
it).  These reasons include:
• The price formula in the admission agreement may not con-
tain a clear and definite reference to the CDM.239
• Even a clearly-referenced CDM-based price formula is illu-
sory, and the prices it calls for may not be fixed at the time of
contracting, as the hospital retains the right to change the
CDM prices used in the formula up to the point it sends the
patient a bill.240
• Even if the court finds that the CDM published by the hospi-
tal fixed the CDM prices at the time of a patient’s admission,
patients cannot understand the CDM and therefore cannot
use the CDM-based price formula to determine how much
they are agreeing to pay even if the CDM is available to
them.  For this reason the patient may not have assented to
the price calculated using the CDM.
• Even if all of these issues are overcome in a particular case, a
CDM-based price formula will very likely yield a grossly ex-
235. See supra notes 203 – 204 and accompanying text.
236. Recall that these CDM-based prices are on average on average 500 per-
cent of the Medicare rate and over 300 percent of the in-network commercial in-
surer reimbursement rate.
237. See supra notes 1–26 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 204–224 and accompanying text.
239. See, e.g., Doe v. HCA Health Servss of Tenn., 46 S.W. 3d 191 (Tenn.
2001).
240. See supra notes 204 – 224 and accompanying text.
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cessive price that is substantively unconscionable.  As a result,
a court may find that a hospital’s attempt to enforce the price
formula violates the hospital’s obligation to perform and en-
force the contract in good faith.241
• CDM-based price formulas are usually contained in adhesion
contracts, which are procedurally unconscionable.  As a re-
sult, if the CDM price formula produces an unconscionable
price, then both requirements for finding a contract uncon-
scionable have been met, and the contract is
unenforceable.242
241. See, e.g., Nygaard v. Sioux Valley Hosp. & Health Sys., 731 N.W. 2d 184,
194 (S.D. 2007). Patients argue that the Hospitals breached the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing by charging prices that did not relate to the cost of the ser-
vices and were unreasonable and unexpected based on the Hospitals’ representa-
tions. Id.  The court noted that South Dakota does not recognize an independent
cause of action, a tort, based on good faith. Id.  However, the court cited with
approval a provision of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC 1-203) that provides
that “Every contract or duty within this title imposes an obligation of good faith in
its performance or enforcement.” Id. at 193–194 (citing U.C.C. § 2-203 (AM. LAW.
INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N (1977)).  The court denied that the covenant of good
faith had been breached because the patient in the pleadings claimed that the ad-
mission agreement called for the hospital to charge its “pre-set charges” and that
the hospital had indeed charged the patient its pre-set charges:
In the instant cases the express language of the contracts addressed the
price issue.  As previously explained, although the price of every hospital
service was not itemized in the contracts, the pleadings allege that the
charges were pre-set.  And because these pre-set charges were fixed and
determinable, these contracts addressed the issue of price and there is no
basis to supply different price terms.
Id. at 194. Very important in this case was the fact that the patients were the
plaintiffs seeking to recover damages from the hospital.  It seems as though the
results would likely have been different had the hospital been suing the patients
trying to recover its CDM-based prices under the contract.  For example, the court
stated:
Counsel acknowledged at oral argument that the nature of an adhesion
claim does not give rise to an independent cause of action for damages.
But even aside from this acknowledgement, and assuming that the con-
tract was an unconscionable contract of adhesion, patients have no right
to recover damages simply because they entered into an unconscionable
contract.
Id. at 195 (notes omitted).
242. Id. at 194–95 (explaining that patients pleaded that the Hospitals did not
provide an opportunity for negotiating the agreements and that there was greatly
disparate and wholly unequal bargaining power.  They further pleaded that such
standardized contracts are contracts of adhesion that are unconscionable and con-
trary to public policy.  In determining whether a contract is an unenforceable con-
tract of adhesion, this Court looks not only at the bargaining power between the
parties but also at the specific terms of the agreement.  Thus, we focus on both
“overly harsh or one-sided terms,” i.e., substantive unconscionability; and how the
contract was made (which includes whether there was a meaningful choice), i.e.,
procedural unconscionability.  (notes omitted); Nation, Obscene Contracts supra
note 2 at 110–115 (discussing the analytical framework for unconscionability and
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As a result, courts should rarely, if ever, enforce CDM-based
price formulas.243
C. Determining the Fair and Reasonable Value of Healthcare
There is no single, universally accepted method for determin-
ing the fair and reasonable price to be paid for healthcare ser-
vices.244  However, two methods are most often recommended.
specifically addressing the two requirements of procedural and substantive
unconscionability).
243. See supra notes 204–224 and accompanying text.
244. Colomar v. Mercy Hosp. Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1267–1268 (S. D. Fla.
2006). The court explained that the patient came to the hospital suffering shortness
of breath and received treatment, her stay at the hospital lasted 26 hours.  The
patient received a bill for $12,863.  Prior to receiving any treatment or services
from Mercy, patient signed an “Authorization and Guarantee” form (the “con-
tract”) in which she agreed to pay all bills not otherwise covered by insurance or
other means; the services she would need and the prices she would pay were un-
specified in the contract.  In support of an unreasonable pricing claim the patient
made the following factual allegations: patient was charged nearly $12,863 for
medical services, while the actual costs of the services were only $2,098; the hospi-
tal generally charged uninsured patients prices set at 450% of Medicare reimburse-
ment rates; the hospital ranks among the top 13% of all hospitals nationwide in
charges (including both for-profit and non-profit hospitals); the hospital’s cost-to-
charge ratio is 394%, meaning that on average the hospital charges almost four
times their costs to uninsured patients; the hospital ranks in the top 10% of hospi-
tals nationwide in terms of cost-to-charge ratio. Id. at 1268.  The court noted that
the establishment of a reasonable price requires consideration of several factors;
the prices charged by other hospitals in the area, the actually paid by the hospitals
other patients, and the hospital’s cost structure.  Importantly, the court noted that
there is evidence that all hospital’s set greatly inflated charges and therefore even
if the hospital’s charges are in line with the charges of other hospitals in the area
this is no guaranty that the hospital’s charges are reasonable.  The court stated:
In addition to a market analysis, the case law reveals that the price
charged for the same services to other patients within the same hospital is
also relevant to the question of reasonableness. . . .  This factor is impor-
tant in the analysis because the prices charged to other patients, and the
amounts received from them, within the same system often differ, and
this difference may offer some insight into the value of the actual services
provided.  Indeed, as the Temple University court [see Temple supra note
140 at 510] explained, the reality is that the rates hospitals charge for
services do not always accurately reflect the value of the services, espe-
cially when the hospital routinely accepts much less for them.
Id. at 1271 – 72.
When that is the case, then simply looking at the rates charged relative to
other hospitals can give a false sense of value.  That is, if other hospitals
grossly overcharge for services relative to their costs, then a mere side-by-
side comparison of hospitals’ unreasonable charges would make them ap-
pear reasonable.  Such consistency, standing alone, is not synonymous
with reasonableness.  Here, Plaintiff alleges that patients with insurance
and government benefits receive significant discounts in the price they
pay for Mercy’s services.  This suggests that the value of the services
charged to Plaintiff may be significantly less than what Mercy asked her
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The first and best approach is to use a market-based reimbursement
price.245  If, with respect to the hospital or other provider in ques-
tion, there is a reasonably well-functioning free market for health-
care, then that market will determine the appropriate price.246  The
other approach, which must be used in cases where there is not a
properly-functioning market, is the Medicare-based approach.247
Under this approach, the person seeking to determine the price
starts with the price that Medicare would pay the hospital for the
care in question.248  These two approaches are discussed below at
subsections 2 and 3, respectively.249
to pay.  This allegation, if borne out during discovery, would be evidence
in support of the conclusion that the charges imposed on Plaintiff are
unreasonable.  (citations omitted)
Id. at 1272.
245. See Nation, Fair & Reasonable, supra note 1 at 460–465 (discussing both
approaches and noting that the prices actually paid by private insurers are a good
place to start in calculating the value of medical services because these contracts
reflect most strongly an effectively operating free market.) (notes omitted).
246. Id. See also, e.g., Nassau Anesthesia Assocs. P.C. v. Chin, 924 N.Y.S.2d
252, 255 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2011) (referring to the average amount the hospital would
have accepted as full payment from third-party payors such as private insurers and
federal health programs and noting that the hospital’s billing manager calculated
this amount as $4252.11); Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Alts., Inc.,
832 A.2d 501, 510 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (“Reasonable value [of hospital services]
. . . is the value paid by the relevant community. The relevant community in this
case comprises the Hospital’s patients who are covered by insurance policies and
federal programs.”); Barak Richman, et al., Overbilling and Informed Financial
Consent–A Contractual Solution, N. ENGL. J. MED. 367, 396–97 (2012) (“The best
proxy for informed bargaining is what similarly situated customers and providers
actually bargain for – namely, the rate negotiated between providers and private
insurers.”)
247. A Review of Hospital Billing and Collection Practices Before the Sub-
comm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
108th Cong. 22 (2004) (statement of Gerard F. Anderson, Director, Johns Hopkins
Center for Center for Hospital Finance and Management) (suggesting that a fair
and reasonable price can be arrived by taking the Medicare DRG based reim-
bursement and adding 25% to that amount; in other words, a reasonable price can
be arrived by taking 125% of the Medicare DRG based reimbursement); see Na-
tion, Fair & Reasonable, supra note 1 at 463 – 465 (discussing Professor Ander-
son’s approach); Richman et al supra note 246 at 397 (“Another useful proxy
might be Medicare reimbursement rates, because those rates – offered by the gov-
ernment and accepted by providers, who were permitted to refuse –also approxi-
mate the lower end of the range of prices that a reasonably informed negotiation
would produce.”)
248. See supra note 253.
249. Another approach to establishing a reasonable price is to determine the
provider’s cost of providing the service and then add a reasonable profit to it. See
Colomar v. Mercy Hosp. Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1272 (S. D. Fla. 2006).  The
court stated:
In addition to what a hospital charges others for the same services, and
what the market charges in general, another relevant factor that emerges
from the pertinent case law is the particular hospital’s internal cost struc-
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1. Why Courts Should Not Use CDM Rates
It is important to note that neither the market approach nor
the Medicare approach rely directly on the CDM prices established
by providers.  This is both intentional and important.250  In addi-
tion, it is also important to recognize that usual, customary, and
reasonable charges (often referred to as UCR charges)251 are based
directly on CDM prices; for the reasons discussed below, UCR-
based charges also should not be used to establish the fair and rea-
sonable market value of healthcare.252
The great variation in the price that a patient may owe for
healthcare is due to the bizarre chargemaster-based pricing system
ture. . . . On the other hand, rate increases untethered to any appreciable
increase in costs would raise questions about the reasonableness of the
rate increases and the overall reasonableness of the charges. . . .  This
means that Mercy, as alleged, charged Plaintiff six times what it cost
Mercy to treat her. . . .  the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that
charging 600% above costs is reasonable.
Id.
250. The most important information for courts and legislatures to under-
stand is that paid charges, and not billed charges, represent usual, customary, fair,
and reasonable healthcare prices. Accident supra note 12 at 695; see generally,
Nation, Chargemaster, supra note 2  (explaining how and why billed charges are
exorbitant and should not be used as a measure of reasonable value).
251. Colomar 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1272 (noting that if most hospitals have ex-
cessive charges comparing charges among hospitals is not a reliable indication of
reasonable charges).  I argue here that that is indeed the case today with respect to
hospital chargemaster based prices. See supra notes 1–26 and accompanying text.
Hospitals use a number of deceitful arguments to convince courts they should ap-
ply the hospital’s chargemaster rates to determine the usual, customary, and rea-
sonable price.  For example, hospitals commonly have their billing manager or
other financial officer provide an affidavit or testimony stating, disingenuously,
that all of the hospital’s patients are billed or charged at its chargemaster rates, and
further that the patient’s billed charges, based on its chargemaster rates, represents
the usual, customary, and reasonable charges of the hospital.  This is very deceiv-
ing because hospitals use the word charges to confuse courts by implying charges
are a proxy for payments.  The hospital implies, without ever saying explicitly, its
chargemaster rates are actually the rates most of the hospital’s patients pay.  This
of course is completely false. See Nation, Accident supra note 12 at 658–664 (dis-
cussing how hospitals take advantage of the fact that in most industries the price
listed for a product is very close to the price usually paid for the product).  In fact,
on average, less than 5 percent of hospital patients ever pay excessive
chargemaster rates. Id.  Moreover, chargemaster rates are, on average, more than
300 percent of the amount hospitals are actually paid for their goods and services
and are about 500 percent of Medicare rates. Id.  Thus, chargemaster rates clearly
are not reasonable, customary, or usual. Id.
252. See infra notes 256–277 and accompanying text.  UCR chargers are sim-
ply another name for list or chargemaster prices—and these prices are excessive,
set unilaterally by hospitals and not accepted by the marketplace. They should play
no role in establishing the price of medical care.  There is no percentage that can
be applied to charges to ensure a reasonable price.
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that is unique to the healthcare industry.253  Few people understand
chargemaster-based pricing.254  Many providers take advantage of
this ignorance to price gouge vulnerable patients.255  A large part of
the confusion surrounding chargemaster-based pricing is due to the
sleight of hand that occurs when providers use the word “charges”
as a proxy for “prices.”256  In virtually every other context “the
price” or “the charge” refers to the amount actually paid—that is,
the reimbursement actually received by the seller.257  Healthcare,
however, is unique in that there is a huge difference between what
hospitals refer to as “list prices” or “billed charges” and actual pay-
ments or “reimbursements.”258  This is because, as noted, charges
(CDM prices) are set unilaterally by hospitals, and these CDM
prices are set not to be paid but to be discounted in negotiations
with third-party payers.259  Reimbursements are the true measure
of market value in the context of healthcare, as indeed they are in
any other market.260  As courts begin to understand the misleading
nature of chargemaster-based pricing, their opinions are beginning
to reject the claim made by hospitals that chargemaster-based
prices are reasonable and represent the market value of
healthcare.261
In the case of Medicare and Medicaid, the government sets the
price it will pay.262  These are set prices and not market-determined
prices.  Private health insurers negotiate contracts with hospitals,
usually every year, and those contracts state specifically how much
the health insurer will pay for services received by patients covered
253. See Nation, Chargemaster, supra note 2 at 446 – 457 (discussing the
chargemaster based pricing system).
254. See id. at 446–457.
255. See Nation, Accident, supra note 6 at 647–58.





261. See, e.g., In re North Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co., 559 S.W.3d 128
(Tex. 2018).  The majority opinion held that it “defies logic” to conclude that the
reimbursement rates paid by insurers and government payers “have nothing to do
with the reasonableness of charges” for uninsured patients, particularly because
insurance and government reimbursements “comprise the bulk of a hospital’s in-
come for services rendered.” Id. at 135.  The Majority went on to note that
“[c]ommentators lament the increasingly arbitrary nature of chargemaster prices,
noting that, over time, they have ‘lost any direct connection to costs or to the
amount the hospital actually expect[s] to receive in exchange for its goods and
services.’” Id. at 132 (quoting George A. Nation III, Hospital Chargemaster In-
sanity: Heeling the Healers, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 745, 755 (2016)); Bowden v. Med. Ctr,
Inc., 773 S.E.2d 692, 697–99 (Ga. 2015) (making similar observations).
262. See supra notes 1–26 and accompanying text.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\124-1\DIK103.txt unknown Seq: 53 10-OCT-19 8:44
2019] CONTRACTING FOR HEALTHCARE 143
by that insurer.  The reimbursement prices paid by commercial
health insurers are the only truly market-derived prices for health
care.263  As noted, self-pay patients are usually billed at excessive
chargemaster prices.264  This practice is unfair and cruel to individ-
ual patients; at the same time, it contributes significantly to the ex-
cessive and ever-growing price of healthcare in the United States.265
I have discussed in detail elsewhere the reasons why CDM
prices should play no part whatsoever in the establishment of the
fair and reasonable market value of healthcare.266  In summary,
CDM prices are wildly excessive.  They are not market prices be-
cause they are set unilaterally by providers.  They are rejected by
the marketplace:  no one knowledgeable about healthcare billing
and payment agrees to pay these prices, and on average less than
five percent of patients overall pay these extreme rates.267
Hospitals set CDM prices at an exorbitant level because their
primary purpose is to create leverage in negotiations with commer-
cial health insurers and to force insurers to agree to higher reim-
bursements by threatening to bill their insureds these excessive
rates if the insurance company does not agree to the reimburse-
ments the hospital demands.268  As an additional benefit, the CDM
prices act as anchoring points so the actual reimbursement prices
demanded by the hospital look reasonable and even attractive
when compared to the ridiculously high CDM rates—and of course
this is the hospital’s negotiating plan.269  In other words, hospitals
set CDM prices to be discounted and not to be paid by anyone.270
263. See supra notes 1–26 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 26–78 and accompanying text.
265. See, e.g., Anderson et al., supra note 73 (concluding that the sizable dif-
ferences in health spending between the US and other countries were explained
mainly by health care prices); Zack Cooper et al., Hospital Prices Grew Substan-
tially Faster Than Physician Prices For Hospital-Based Care in 2007–14, 38
HEALTH AFF. 184, 186 (2019), https://bit.ly/2STIayk [https://perma.cc/Z3QL-
AZFN] (suggesting from evidence that growth in providers’ prices drives growth in
health care spending on the privately insured and hospital prices increase faster
than physician prices).
266. See Nation, Fair & Reasonable, supra note 1 at 457–70.
267. Id.  It is important to note that this does not mean that many patients do
not have their lives ruined by hospitals and other providers aggressive but ulti-
mately unsuccessful efforts to collect these excessive rates and in that particular
context of third-party liability, hospitals often misuse hospital lien statutes to re-
cover either all for a large percentage of these excessive rates.
268. See supra notes 1–26 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 1–26 and accompanying text.
270. CDM-based prices are unconscionable. See, e.g., Moran v. Prime
Healthcare Mgmt. Inc., 208 Cal. Rptr. 3d 303 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).  The patient in
Moran alleged that the admission agreements financial liability provision was un-
conscionable. Id. at 315.  The plaintiff claimed that he did not expect to be billed
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However, as noted elsewhere, hospitals never miss an opportunity
to try to collect these unreasonable rates whenever possible; they
pursue these exorbitant reimbursements aggressively, notwithstand-
ing the pain and suffering it causes patients.271
2. Market-Based Pricing
Unfortunately, there is not a properly-functioning free market
for healthcare with respect to self-pay patients.272  However, there
is, in many cases, a well-functioning free market for healthcare with
at the artificial and grossly excessive rates for which he was subsequently billed.
Id.  Patient also alleged that the hospitals charges for medical treatment or not
tethered to their actual costs but were 4 to 6 times those costs and far beyond any
reasonable profit margin. Id.  In addition, patient claimed that the hospitals
charges were intended to boost hospital reimbursement rates interest like higher
levels of charity contribution and financial assistance given to the local community.
Id.  In describing the unconscionability doctrine, the court stated:
The unconscionability doctrine ensures that contracts, particularly con-
tracts of adhesion, do not impose terms that have been variously de-
scribed as “overly harsh”, “unduly oppressive”, “so one-sided as to shock
the conscience”, or “unfairly one-sided.” All of these formulations point
to the central idea that unconscionability doctrine is concerned not with
“a simple old-fashioned bad bargain”, but with terms that are “unreason-
ably favorable to the more powerful party.
Id. (citations omitted).  The court noted that a claim of contractual unconscionabil-
ity, has both a procedural and a substantive element, the former focusing on op-
pression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on overly harsh or
one-sided results. Id.  The court also noted that the procedural element of an un-
conscionable contract generally takes the form of a contract of adhesion, which,
imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the
subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it, while
substantively unconscionable terms may take various forms, but may generally be
described as unfairly one-sided. Id. at 315–16.  The court noted that the patient
alleged that all emergency room patients had to sign the admission agreement
before being treated, and that these allegations, in the context of a summary judge-
ment motion, support a finding of procedural unconscionability. Id. at 316.  As for
substantive unconscionability, the court stated that the price term of a contract can
establish substantive unconscionability. Id.  The court noted that when evaluating
the price charged courts consider, among other factors, not only the market price,
but also the cost of the goods or services to the seller. Id.  The court stated:
This case concerns the cost of medical care provided to uninsured pa-
tients visiting a defendants’ hospital emergency room.  Plaintiff has al-
leged that defendants’ charge description master rates not only far exceed
the actual cost of care and provide for a large profit margin, he further
maintains the purpose of defendants’ charging excessive costs to self-pay
patients is to increase the hospital’s reimbursement for medical care by
dramatically increasing its profit margin for treatment to persons particu-
larly vulnerable because they are in need of emergency medical care.
Id.  The court concluded that the patient had alleged facts sufficient to claim that
the price term in the admission agreement based on chargemaster rates was uncon-
scionable. Id. See also supra notes 204–24 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 1–78 and accompanying text.
272. See Nation, Fair & Reasonable, supra note 1, at 458–59.
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respect to in-network commercial insurance companies.273  Hospi-
tals enter into contracts with various health insurance companies
wherein they negotiate the reimbursement levels that the insurance
company will pay for its members who receive care from the hospi-
tal.274  These contracts are typically renegotiated annually.275
Moreover, insurance companies and hospitals often have relatively
equal bargaining power and knowledge regarding healthcare billing
and reimbursement.276  As a result, these negotiated contracts often
represent the true free market value for health care.277
As I have discussed in detail elsewhere, the average reimburse-
ment price paid by in-network commercial health insurers is often
the best starting point for determining the fair and reasonable mar-
ket-based price of healthcare for self-pay patients.278  However,
commercial health insurance companies provide benefits to hospi-
tals that self-pay patients do not provide.279  These benefits in-
clude—for non-emergency patients280—the increased patient
volume that results from gaining access to all of the insurer’s cus-
tomers and—for all insured patients—quick and reliable payment
of hospital invoices.281  As a result, it may be appropriate to adjust
the average commercial insurer reimbursement rate upward by ten
to 15 percent282 when determining the fair market-based value of
health care for self-pay patients.283
Notwithstanding the fact that, as discussed, some adjustment
may be necessary, a market-based rate is clearly preferable and eas-





278. Id. at 461–62.
279. Nation, Fair and Reasonable, supra note 1 at 462.
280. For emergency care, the Medicare-based rate should apply because there
is no market for emergency care; patients exercise no choice concerning the hospi-
tal to which they are taken.
281. Nation, Fair and Reasonable, supra note 1 at 462.
282. Id. at 463.  Another commentator, using different methodology and ar-
riving at a different formula, nonetheless arrives at a similar amount as represent-
ing a fair reimbursement amount for self-pay patients. Id. at 463–64 (discussing a
proposal by Dr. Gerard Anderson to calculate the price for self-pay patients at the
Medicare reimbursement rate plus 25 percent).
283. It is important to note that even with such an adjustment these rates are
still far less than the excessive CDM rates.  Specifically, if on average commercial
insurers pay 160% of the Medicare rate, then with this adjustment self-pay patients
would pay about 170% to 175% of the Medicare rate, or 34% to 35% of the CDM
rate, given that, on average, the CDM rate is 500% of the Medicare! See supra
note 11.
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ily attainable.284  Hospitals have the necessary information readily
available and can easily calculate their average commercial insurer
reimbursement rate; courts are beginning to recognize patients’
rights to discover this information.285  An additional benefit to us-
ing an average is that no proprietary information of any particular
insurer or hospital need be disclosed.286  Finally, this approach
would allow hospitals to continue to set their prices at any amount
they wish, but would allow them to enforce those prices against self-
pay patients only if the marketplace (commercial health insurers)
accepts and pays those prices.287  It also would have the beneficial
effect of encouraging providers to join insurers’ networks and
thereby decreasing the number of patients that are out-of-network
and subjected to balance billing.288
284. And perhaps best of all, it triggers market solutions to address health
care costs. See, e.g., Barak D. Richman et al., Battling the Chargemaster: A Simple
Remedy to Balance Billing for Unavoidable Out-of-Network Care, 23 AM. J. MAN-
AGED CARE 2017;23(4):e100-e105, 103, https://bit.ly/2XAkvoR [https://perma.cc/
WN6N-8PD8].  Tax exempt hospitals are required under the ACA to compute
their “average billed amount” (AGB) each year. See I.R.C. § 501(r)(5) (West
2011), and Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. Reg. at
38,148–55 (for eligible patients, the billed charges must be reduced to AGB). See
supra note 52 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 257; Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Ser-
vices: Chaos Behind a Veil of Secrecy, 25 HEALTH AFF. 57, 58 (2006) (noting
that each private insurer negotiates the dollar level of payments with each hospital
every year).
286. Hospitals typically claim that such information is proprietary.  The litiga-
tion related discovery of such information can be accomplished by use of a protec-
tive order, but use of an average provides a better overall base. See Nation, Fair
&Reasonable, supra note 1, at 460–61.
287. See Nation, Balance Billing, supra note 6, at 172–73 (discussing the im-
portance of a free market where sellers are allowed to set their own prices and
buyers are free to reject the prices if they are too high).
288. A number of states use a dispute resolution process as a reasonable ap-
proach to establish price. See Jack Hoadley, et al., State Efforts to Protect Consum-
ers from Balance Billing, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND: TO THE POINT (Jan. 18,
2019), https://bit.ly/2OHc7Rr [https://perma.cc/H82A-R3SH] (noting that Califor-
nia, Florida, Illinois, New Hampshire, New York and New Jersey are among the
states that provide a dispute resolution process); Kevin Lucia et al., Balance Billing
by Health Care Providers: Assessing Consumer Protections Across States, THE
COMMONWEALTH FUND 4 (June 13, 2017), https://bit.ly/2O99HJA [https://perma
.cc/R5MJ-D4FX] (defining a dispute resolution process as: “An independent medi-
ation or other process through which providers and insurers can negotiate or settle
on a fair rate of payment for a claim.”).  A potential problem with arbitration is
the increased administrative expense associated with it. See Loren Adler, et al.,
State Approaches to Mitigating Surprise Out-of-Network Billing, USC-BROOKINGS
SCHAEFFER INITIATIVE FOR HEALTH POL’Y 24 (Feb. 2019), https://brook.gs/
2T3qOTJ [https://perma.cc/SE4L-NSCQ] (noting that: “An arbitration approach
also comes with administrative costs. If those administrative costs are high enough,
they could undermine the effectiveness of the policy by leading insurers to simply
accede to providers’ demands rather than pursue arbitration.”).  Some proposed
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3. Medicare-Based Pricing
Government insurers—Medicare and Medicaid—pay rates set
by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS); these
rates are not the result of market competition.289  Technically, hos-
pitals do not have to agree to accept government insurance.290
Hospitals agree to accept Medicare rates only when they sign a pro-
vider agreement with CMS.291  Practically speaking, however, given
that the U.S. government spends almost 20 percent of its budget on
healthcare, it is unrealistic for most hospitals not to accept Medi-
care patients.292
The rates paid by government insurers typically represent the
lowest rates that hospitals agree to accept as full payment; Medicaid
rates are lower than Medicare rates.293  Many commentators have
argued that Medicaid rates are actually too low:  that is, that they
are below hospital cost.294  Some commentators have also made
that argument with regard to the Medicare rates.295  Although a
thorough evaluation of these claims is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle, it does seem likely, based on the available evidence that Medi-
care reimbursement rates may need to be adjusted upward in order
to arrive at a fair and reasonable price.296
One expert has argued in favor of setting the reimbursement
rate for hospitals at 125 percent of the Medicare reimbursement
bills address this problem by requiring that the arbitration results be made public.
This type of arbitration is a good alternative, as long as the arbiters are instructed
to consider negotiated in-network rates and Medicare rates, but not provider
charges in any form. See George A. Nation III, Congress Should Broaden Legisla-
tion to Curb Medical Price Gouging, THE HILL (Nov. 8, 2018) http://bit.ly/2SkqbT3
[https://perma.cc/RR2D-8283] (discussing legislative proposals).
289. See Nation, Fair & Reasonable, supra note 1, at 463–64 (discussing the
proposal by Dr. Gerard Anderson to calculate the price for self-pay patients at the
Medicare reimbursement rate, plus an additional 25%).
290. See Nation, Chargemaster supra note 2, at 661 (noting that when hospi-
tals voluntarily agree to accept Medicare and Medicaid patients by signing a Pro-
vider Agreement, they also agree to accept the amount paid by Medicare and
Medicaid as full payment).
291. Id.
292. See Policy Basics: Where Do Our Federal Tax Dollars Go?, CTR. ON
BUDGET AND POL’Y. PRIORITIES, (Jan. 2019) http://bit.ly/2YOtl3R [https://perma
.cc/7F6T-MRQW] (explaining that during fiscal year 2017, the federal government
spent four trillion dollars, or about 21% of the country’s gross domestic product).
293. See supra notes 1-26 and accompanying text.
294. See Nation, Fair & Reasonable, supra note 1, at 459–60 (stating that gov-
ernment insurers’ reimbursement rates are thought to be below fully allocated
costs).
295. See, e.g., Virgil Dickson, Slumping Medicare Margins Put Hospitals on
Precarious Cliff, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Nov. 28, 2017), http://bit.ly/2YPpgMG
[https://perma.cc/HFQ5-XVRS].
296. See supra note 294.
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rate.297  The Medicare plus 25 percent-based rate is usually similar
in amount to the average in-network commercial insurance com-
pany reimbursement rate plus ten to 15 percent, as discussed
above.298  An important benefit to using Medicare rates is that they
are readily available and updated regularly by CMS.299  The main
drawback to using Medicare rates is that they are not market-based
prices.300  As such, the Medicare approach denies hospitals the abil-
ity to establish their own prices.301
It is important to note that under the market-based price ar-
gued for above, hospitals continue to have the power to set their
own prices, but those prices must be accepted by the marketplace to
be enforceable against self-pay patients.302  In other words, hospi-
tals may set their rates at any level they wish as long as they can
entice insurance companies, the only other market participants with
the knowledge and market power to negotiate fairly with them, to
agree to pay those rates.303
However, it may not always be possible to use the market-
based price approach because some markets are not adequately
competitive.304  In those cases, using Medicare-based prices may be
necessary.305  For example, there is no competitive market for pa-
tients who enter the hospital through the emergency department.306
These patients do not choose the hospital to which they are admit-
ted; that choice is typically made by the ambulance company.307
Also, in the case of non-emergency admissions, if a hospital does
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.; see Susannah Luthi, California Hospitals Blast New Rate-Setting Pro-
posal for Providers, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Apr. 10, 2018) http://bit.ly/30uJFa6
[https://perma.cc/DMQ8-J9XM] (discussing a California proposal that would man-
date a regulated rate for providers and would use Medicare rates as the benchmark
to calculate commercial insurance payments).
300. Id.
301. See Nation, Accident, supra note 12, at 686 (noting that using the average
negotiated private insurance rate plus an additional 10 to 15% allows hospitals to
continue to set their prices at any level they wish as long as they can get the insur-
ance companies—the only other market participants with the knowledge and
power to fairly negotiate with hospitals—to agree to pay those rates).
302. Id.
303. Id.; see Nation, Balance Billing, supra note 6, at 172–73.
304. See Nation, Accident, supra note 6, at 686 (noting that some markets are
not adequately competitive and therefore, resorting to a Medicare based rate may
be necessary).
305. Id.
306. Id. at 685 (“There is no benefit of new patients associated with emer-
gency care.”).
307. Id.
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not have at least three in-network insurance companies, then the
only option is to use Medicare prices.308
CONCLUSION
Patients sign the same standard hospital admission agreement
regardless of whether they enter the hospital under emergency cir-
cumstances through the emergency department or through a non-
emergency admission.  However, from a contracting perspective
these two situations differ significantly.  As a result, emergency and
non-emergency situations must be analyzed separately.  But, while
the legal analysis applied to these two situations is different, the
ultimate conclusion is the same.  Admission agreements signed by
self-pay patients should never be enforced in a way that requires a
patient to pay a price greater than the fair and reasonable market
value of the healthcare services received.  Under contract law prin-
ciples, self-pay patients should be required to pay an amount equal
to the fair market value of the care that they received, regardless of
whether the patient signed an admission agreement containing a
CDM-based price formula.
When a hospital admission agreement is signed in the emer-
gency department, the extreme circumstances under which it is
signed prevent the patient from being able to give free and knowing
assent.  Moreover, proper application of the doctrine of objective
intent and the duty to read reaches the same conclusion.  This appli-
cation dictates that the admission agreement is not a contract.  The
patient’s only obligation to the hospital is based on quasi-contract,
and pursuant to quasi-contract the patient is liable to pay the rea-
sonable market value of the medical care received.
In a non-emergency admission, it is at least theoretically possi-
ble for a patient to give free and knowing assent to the admission
agreement.  For example, for elective surgery that is not medically
necessary (for example, a cosmetic procedure that is not required to
preserve or improve the patient’s health), the admission agreement
signed by the patient (which interestingly, for cosmetic procedures,
typically contains an actual dollars-and-cents price) may be
enforceable.
However, in the vast majority of non-emergency hospital ad-
missions, the admission agreement that a patient is required to sign
is a quintessential example of the modern contract of adhesion.  It
is a one-sided agreement drafted solely by the hospital, which is the
stronger and much more well-informed party, presented to the pa-
308. Id. at 686.
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tient on a take-it-or-leave-it basis wherein the patient has abso-
lutely no ability to negotiate the terms of the agreement.
However, the fact that hospital admission agreements are ad-
hesion contracts does not automatically make them unenforceable.
Categorizing these contracts as adhesion contracts is significant be-
cause it signals to courts that they should approach hospital admis-
sion agreements with caution.  Courts should closely scrutinize the
contract formation process, to determine if an enforceable contract
has been created.  If it has, courts should look closely at the provi-
sions of the contract to ensure that the stronger party is not taking
advantage of the weaker party.
If the court concludes that a non-emergency admission agree-
ment has not created an express contract, then the court will most
likely find that an implied-in-fact contract has been created based
on the conduct of the parties.  In that case, recovery should be for
the reasonable market value of the medical services.  Again, while
the legal analysis may be somewhat different for express and im-
plied-in-fact contracts, the conclusion is the same:  the patient is lia-
ble to pay no more than the reasonable market value of the medical
care received.
If, notwithstanding the adhesive nature of the admission agree-
ment, the court concludes that an enforceable express contract ex-
ists, then the court should refuse to enforce any payment formula
contained in the admission agreement that results in an excessive
price.  Most admission agreements contain CDM-based price for-
mulas, and in most cases applying these formulas will result in a
grossly exorbitant price.  Because of this, courts should refuse to
enforce most CDM-based price formulas.
Thus, though the legal analyses are different, the conclusion for
most self-pay patients will be the same.  Whether patients are ad-
mitted to the hospital through the emergency department or not,
and whether the standard admission agreement they may have
signed is deemed to be a contract or not, they should be liable to
pay the hospital no more than the fair and reasonable value of the
healthcare that they have received.  The burden placed on courts to
determine the fair and reasonable market value of healthcare is not
a difficult burden for the courts to bear.  The information necessary
to determine the fair and reasonable value of healthcare in specific
cases is readily available and easily applied.  Finally, judicial recog-
nition and application of the analysis presented here will not only
protect self-pay patients from price gouging but also help check the
excessive and ever-increasing cost of American healthcare without
eliminating hospital pricing autonomy.
